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Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace
Harassment Claims
L. CAMLLE HEBERT*
Drawing analogies between one area of the law and another promises to
have beneficial effects on developing areas of the law-an established legal
concept applied in a new context helps legitimize claims in fledgling areas of
the law. Analogizing sex to race has helped to establish the legitimacy of sex-
based workplace harassment claims. However, analogizing race to sex may be
more problematic, because use of that analogy threatens to adversely affect
race-based claims of workplace harassment.
Sexual harassment law has developed its own standards ofproof to analyze
hostile environment claims, standards designed with an intent to defeat claims
thought to be insignificant or frivolous. Applying those standards to claims of
racial harassment may erode the ability of victims of race-based harassment to
prevail on legitimate claims. In addition, analogizing race and sex risks
ignoring the very real and important differences between race and sex. On the
other hand, analogizing race and sex may help decisionmakers to recognize the
discriminatory nature of both types of conduct and the real harms caused by
those workplace activities.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE "Two-EDGED SWORD" OF ANALOGY
The use of analogy is pervasive in legal reasoning and analysis.' Drawing
analogies between that which is legally uncertain or unproven and that which is
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1 See EDWARD H. LEvI, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1948)
(indicating that the basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example, by which
similarity is seen between cases, the rule of law of the first case is articulated, and then the
rule of law is made applicable to the second case). See also JOvAN BRKaC, LEGAL
REASONING: SEMANTIC AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS 82 (1985) (indicating that reasoning by
analogy is a major mode of reasoning in all legal systems, particularly the Anglo-American
legal system).
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known or recognized is a common method of gaining acceptance for new legal
claims and theories. To the extent that a new claim can be shown to be similar
to the established claim, the new claim gains legitimacy. But this effect may not
be the only result of drawing analogies between new and established claims. To
the extent that there is uncertainty about the legitimacy of the new claim,
analogizing new and established claims may cast a shadow on the established
claim. 2
This "two-edged sword" aspect of use of analogy can be seen in the
decisions of the courts dealing with issues of workplace harassment. The
explicit and implicit comparisons drawn by the courts between sexual
harassment and racial harassment have produced both of these positive and
negative effects. For some courts, drawing analogies between race and sex in
the context of workplace harassment has allowed the courts to understand and
to demonstrate the unlawful and discriminatory nature of sexually harassing
behavior. On the other hand, by importing into the racial context legal
standards refined and given substance in connection with sexual harassment
claims-for which the courts have adopted a number of measures to protect
against what are perceived to be nonmeritorious, trivial, or even frivolous
claims3-the courts have made it increasingly difficult for employees to
successfully establish the existence of a racially hostile or abusive work
environment. Therefore, for some courts, the use of analogies between racial
and sexual harassment, rather than causing them to recognize the seriousness of
sexual harassment, may in fact have caused them to take claims of racial
harassment less seriously.
Somewhat paradoxically, the seeds of both of these approaches are found in
the very same decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of the lower
2 See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreward: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 27 (1987) (suggesting that the majority of the United
States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), a case involving a
challenge to race discrimination in the administration of the death penalty, analogized race,
sex, and ethnicity to physical appearance as a way to "trivialize" the concerns of the
dissenting justices as to the effect of race in death penalty cases).
3 For example, the requirement that the plaintiff establish the "unwelcomeness" of
sexually harassing conduct, and the willingness of the Court in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986), to allow introduction of evidence about an employee's
"dress and personal fantasies" with respect to that issue suggests a concern that women will
entice men to engage in sexual conduct and then complain of sexual harassment. See infra text
accompanying notes 15-17. Similarly, the requirement adopted by a number of lower courts,
and only recently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993), that a plaintiff demonstrate the existence of severe
psychological injury even to state a claim of sexual harassment, indicates a concern that
women will seek recovery for trivial conduct not worthy of the attention of the courts.
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courts on which those Supreme Court decisions rely; the language and analysis
of the Court points in both of these directions at once. For while the Supreme
Court analogized race and sex in order to bolster its recognition of sexual
harassment as a form of actionable sex discrimination, the Court also used
language and adopted standards for sexual harassment claims that have the
potential to make it more difficult to establish all claims of discriminatory
harassment. Therefore, lower courts whose use of analogies between racial
harassment and sexual harassment has resulted in bolstering claims of sexual
harassment and those whose use has resulted in a weakening of racial
harassment claims both have been able to make credible contentions that they
are following the lead of the United States Supreme Court. In fact, the Court's
very uncertainty about the appropriateness and implications of this analogy
appears to be responsible for the mixed signals received by the lower courts.
Part I1 of this Article will first address the appropriateness of drawing
analogies between race and sex in the context of claims of workplace
harassment by exploring both judicial acceptance of these analogies and the
actual differences and similarities between race and sex, as well as the
intersection of race and sex, particularly as it applies to the harassment of
minority-group women. Next, I will explore in Part II the manner in which the
courts have applied analogies between race and sex in the context of selected
elements of harassment claims in order to demonstrate the effects of analogizing
race and sex. Finally, I will suggest in Part IV of the article that, although the
benefits of analogizing racial harassment and sexual harassment are
considerable and ultimately justify this use of analogy, there is great need to be
cognizant of and diligent in guarding against the costs that analogizing race and
sex can impose.
II. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ANALOGIES BETWEEN RACE AND SEX
A. Judicial Treatment of Explicit Analogies Between Race and Sex
At one level, the use of analogies between race and sex in the context of
Title VII's 4 prohibition against discrimination in employment is neither new nor
controversial. Although Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination has
unusual origins in that the inclusion of the word "sex" in Title VII was
apparently initially proposed in order to prevent the enactment of the entire
statute, 5 the statute's legislative history generally reflects a rejection of
4 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1994).
5 See congressional debate on the amendment offered by Representative Smith proposing
the addition of the term "sex" to Title VII. 110 CoNG. REC. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in
U.S. EQUAL EMPLoYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF Tims VII
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differential treatment of sex and race discrimination. 6 Similarly, the United
States Supreme Court has had no difficulty in recognizing that standards
adopted in the context of race discrimination are also applicable in the context
of sex discrimination, for both disparate treatment7 and disparate impact
claims.8  Accordingly, the hesitation of some courts to accept the
appropriateness of analogies between race and sex in the context of workplace
harassment claims probably has much to do with the somewhat grudging
acceptance by courts of sexual harassment as a form of actionable sex
AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS Acr op 1964, at 3213-28 (1968). In explaining his support of the
amendment, Representative Smith discussed the "rights" of women to find a husband as one
of the reasons for his proposed amendment. The debate on the proposed amendment contains
suggestions that supporters of the amendment sought to include "sex" in the bill as a method
of damaging the proposed statute, and some of the stated opposition to amendment was on
that ground. For a discussion of the origins of the inclusion of the term "sex" in Title VII, see
BARBARA IUNDEvMANN & DAviD D. KADUE, SExuAL HARAssMENTr IN EMPLOYMENr LAw 3
n.2 (1992) (indicating that "sex" was added to Title VII by its opponents as a last-minute
effort to defeat the bill). See also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C.
INDuS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 441 (1966) (indicating that inclusion of the term "sex" in Title
VII was "in the spirit of satire").
Interestingly, the apparent effort of Representative Smith to defeat the entire statute by
seeking to point out what he apparently believed to be the absurdity of extending the
protection of the statute to gender discrimination may foreshadow the subsequent use of
analogies between race and sex to weaken claims of racial discrimination.
6 The proposed amendment to add "sex" to the prohibited grounds for employment
discrimination was opposed, among other reasons, on the ground that sex was sufficiently
different from other protected characteristics to merit separate statutory treatment. See 110
CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPpoRTUNrry
COMM'N, LEGISLATVE HIsroRY oF TI VII AND XI OF Cwvm PIGHs ACT oF 1964, at
3213-28 (1968). The adoption of the proposed amendment by a vote of 168 to 133 over those
objections presumably represents a rejection of that argument.
See also H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2141 ("Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited
employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any
type of unlawful discrimination.").
7 The first disparate treatment case decided by the United States Supreme Court was
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), involving a claim of intentional
race discrimination. The standards adopted in that case were later applied by the Court in the
context of a claim of intentional sex discrimination in Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
8 The United States Supreme Court articulated the standards for disparate impact claims
in the context of a claim of race discrimination in Giggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), and then adopted those standards for sex discrimination claims in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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discrimination9 in spite of the Supreme Court's pronouncement to that effect.' 0
The initial use of explicit analogies between race and sex in the context of
workplace harassment claims appears to have been motivated by a desire to
increase the awareness of the harm caused by sexual harassment and to create
better acceptance of sexual harassment claims. This use of analogy can be
found in the first case of discriminatory workplace harassment to reach the
United States Supreme Court. In Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson," the Court
suggested that sexual harassment was analogous to other forms of
discriminatory harassment such as harassment on the basis of race or ethnic
characteristics. In finding sexual harassment that creates a hostile working
environment to be actionable under Title VII, the Court referred with approval
to cases recognizing hostile environment claims based on race. 12 The Court's
quotation of the following passage from a lower court case indicates the Court's
belief in the appropriateness of the analogy between the two types of
harassment:
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege
of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets" 13
This analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment supported
the decision of the Meitor Court to recognize the existence of a hostile
environment caused by sexually harassing conduct as unlawful sex
discrimination, just as a racially hostile environment had been recognized as a
form of unlawful race discrimination. However, after recognizing the
similarities between racial and sexual harassment and stating boldly that "Title
VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from
9 For a discussion of the reluctance of courts to treat sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination, see L. Camille H~bert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment for
Women, 3 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 41, Spring 1994, at 42-44, 50.
10 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question, when
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.").
11 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
12 See Meitor, 477 U.S. at 66 (citing Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. St. Louis,
549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176
(D.C. Cir. 1976)).
13 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Heson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir.
1982)).
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discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult," 14 the Court went on to
impose stringent burdens on employees alleging sexually harassing workplace
conduct. The imposition of these burdens belie the Court's belief in the
appropriateness of the analogy, because it is unlikely that those standards would
have been imposed with respect to other claims of discriminatory harassment.
The Court stressed that only "unwelcome" sexual conduct was actionable
under Title VII and that the determination of whether conduct was unwelcome
presented "difficult problems of proof."15 These proof problems focus on what
the Court said was the critical issue of "whether respondent by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome."1 6 Among the
conduct deemed relevant by the Court to the question of whether the
employee's conduct indicated the welcomeness or unwelcomeness of the
harasser's conduct was the employee's "sexually provocative speech or dress"
and "publicly expressed sexual fantasies." 17 The Court's discussion of the
unwelcomeness requirement indicates its belief that it is difficult to distinguish
between welcome and unwelcome sexual conduct in the workplace and seems
to presume that the conduct is welcome unless the woman affirmatively and
unambiguously indicates otherwise. The Court's choice of language also
suggests that a woman's word that sexual conduct is unwanted is insufficient
and can be overcome by the harasser's understanding of her conduct. The
Court's use of the word "provocative" also seems to imply that women are
responsible for the sexually harassing conduct directed at them. It is difficult to
imagine the Supreme Court saying any of those things in the context of racial
harassment.
In addition, the Court discussed, without resolving, the issue of whether the
employer could be held liable for sexual harassment by the employee's
supervisor. Departing from the guidelines of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which indicated that employers were liable
for sexual harassment by supervisory employees just as they were for other
forms of discrimination by supervisory employees,' 8 the Court indicated that
there were limits on the extent to which employers could be held liable for the
14 Id. at 65.
15 Id. at 68.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 68-69.
18 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c), (d) (1985). The amicus brief filed by the Solicitor
General of the United States on behalf of the EEOC took a position on employer liability
inconsistent with its own guidelines, suggesting that, absent notice, employers should not be
automatically liable for sexually harassing conduct of supervisory employees that created a
hostile work environment. See description of amicus brief in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 74-77
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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sexually harassing conduct of even supervisory employees when the supervisor
was not directly exercising the authority delegated by the employer. 19 The
Court's hesitation to hold employers responsible for the sexually harassing
conduct of supervisory employees and its willingness to depart from the rules of
employer liability generally applicable in the discrimination context suggest that
it perceived sexually related conduct in the workplace to be personally
motivated rather than job-related, as other forms of discrimination, such as race
discrimination, were apparently considered to be.20
Two other aspects of the Court's decision also suggested, perhaps
unintentionally, that the Court perceived differences between racial and sexual
harassment relevant to the standards that it was adopting. The Court stressed
that only "severe or pervasive" sexual conduct was actionable under Title VII,
relying in part on the standards adopted by the lower courts for actionable racial
harassment. 2' Although finding that this standard was met by the employee's
allegations, the Court's choice of language may have been unfortunate. The
Court noted that the employee's allegations of harassment by her supervisor-
which included claims that she had been fondled in front of other employees,
had been subjected to repeated demands for sex, had been coerced into having
sexual intercourse, and had been raped-were "plainly sufficient." 22 The
Court's language, however, gave no indication of what type of conduct short of
that alleged would meet the "severe or pervasive" standard, leaving room for
the possibility that only similar types of conduct would meet the standard. 23 It is
19 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71.
20 See id. at 70-71 (indicating that the courts have consistently held employers liable for
discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisors even if the employer was unaware of
or disapproved of the supervisor's actions). The concurring justices took issue with the
majority's resolution of the issue of employer liability for supervisory harassment. Drawing
their own analogy to racial discrimination, the justices indicated that "when a supervisor
discriminatorily fires or refuses to promote a black employee, that act is, without more,
considered the act of the employer." Id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The Court's reluctance to hold employers liable for sexual harassment by supervisory
employees in the absence of some evidence of direct employer culpability is reminiscent of
the prior unwillingness of the lower courts to find employer liability for what the courts
deemed to be personal conduct motivated by sexual desire. See infra text accompanying notes
180-83.
21 Id. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (-'[M]ere
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee'
would not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant degree to violate Title
VII.")).
22 1d. at 67.
23 Almost a decade later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the
Court seemed to acknowledge that its language may have been misread:
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difficult to imagine that the Court would have required, or would have been
understood as requiring, an equivalent level of racial hostility for recognition of
racially harassing conduct as unlawful.
Finally, the Court's very language recognizing hostile environment sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination can be read as suggesting a
difference between sexual harassment and other forms of discriminatory
harassment. When the Court asserted that "without question, when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex," 24 the Court might be understood as
suggesting that not all sexual harassment is "because of sex" and that only
harassment found to be so motivated is actionable under Title VII. This
interpretation of the Court's language would suggest a different view of sexual
and racial harassment, because it is difficult to conceive of the Court suggesting
that racially harassing conduct could be found not to be racially motivated.
After drawing the initial analogy between race and sex and then articulating
standards for the sexual harassment claim before it, the Meritor Court was
silent on the issue of whether it believed that the standards that it was adopting
for sexual harassment claims might apply to other claims of harassment, such as
racial harassment. However, more recently, the Court has suggested the
appropriateness of a single standard for judging claims of discriminatory
harassment. In its second decision dealing with sexual harassment, Harris v.
Forkhft Systems, Inc.,25 the Court discussed in common terms "a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin" without any hint that different standards might be applicable to
these different types of harassment. 26 Another basis for reading the Court's
opinion in Harris as support for a common standard for all claims of
discriminatory harassment is the Court's failure to expressly identify by name
the nature of the harassment alleged. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
makes reference to "a discriminatorily 'abusive work environment"' and to
"'abusive work environment' harassment," 27 but nowhere uses the term
The appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in that case to environments
"'so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers,'" merely present some especially
egregious examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what is
actionable.
Id. at 22 (citations and some internal quotation marks deleted).24 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
25 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
26 1d. at 22.
27 Id. at 18, 20.
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"sexual harassment" or gives any indication that the nature of the harassment
alleged has any bearing on the issue before the Court. Only in Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion is the term "sexual harassment" used.28
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris was more explicit on this point.
In discussing the standard for actionable harassment articulated in a lower court
racial harassment case, she noted: "Davis concerned race-based discrimination,
but that difference does not alter the analysis; except in the rare case in which a
bona fide occupational qualification is shown, Title VII declares discriminatory
practices based on race, gender, religion, or national origin equally
unlawful." 29 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg explicitly took the position that
racial and sexual harassment claims should be subjected to the same standard.
However, in the case to which Justice Ginsburg referred, Davis v.
Monsanto Chemical Co.,30 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit explicitly took the position that the standards for actionable sexual
harassment and actionable racial harassment were different. The court of
appeals gave no justification for this different treatment, simply concluding,
with a questionable analogy to constitutional analysis, that "the application of
slightly different standards in different types of hostile work environment claims
is entirely consistent with established civil rights jurisprudence."31
The Davis court's decision to apply different standards to racial harassment
and sexual harassment has been seen by some as an attempt by the court of
appeals to distance itself from the onerous standards for establishing a claim
applied by that court in a previous sexual harassment case, Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co.32 The concurring and dissenting judge in Davis chided the
majority for "its fervor to distance itself from Rabidue," resulting in different
28 See id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 25-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations and footnote omitted). For a
discussion of the irrelevance of the bona fide occupational defense to sexual harassment
claims, see infra text accompanying notes 63-66.
30 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988).
3 1 Id. at 348 n. 1. The Davis court's reference to constitutional standards is suspect
because, while the courts have recognized different levels of scrutiny under equal protection
analysis, there is nothing in Title VII that suggests that different protected classes are entitled
to different levels of protection from discrimination. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
See also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.6 (1994) (noting that the Court "once again
need not decide whether classifications based on gender are inherently suspect").
A year after its decision in Davis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed its decision to apply different standards to claims of racial and sexual
harassment. In Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 484-85
(6th Cir. 1989), the court of appeals indicated that the decision in Davis to apply different
standards to claims of racial harassment and sexual harassment was incorrect.32 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
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standards for judging racial and sexual harassment. 33 And, indeed, aspects of
the majority's opinion in Davis do suggest that the court of appeals may have
been trying to avoid the effects of applying the standards for sexual harassment
articulated in Rabidue in the context of racial harassment. For example, the
Davis court cautioned against relying on its prior opinion in Rabidue to
"erroneously... encourag[e] the perpetuation of the status quo" :34
In Rabidue, this court quoted with approval a passage from the district court's
opinion. This court stated that "'Title VII [was] not designed to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers."'
In reading this passage, however, one should place emphasis on the word
"magical," not the word "transformation." Title VII was not intended to
eliminate immediately all private prejudice and biases. That law, however, did
alter the dynamics of the workplace because it operates to prevent bigots from
harassing their co-workers.. . . In essence, while Title VII does not require an
employer to fire all "Archie Bunkers" in its employ, the law does require that
an employer take prompt action to prevent such bigots from expressing their
opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-workers.35
In spite of the protestations of the Davis court to the contrary, this approach
was indeed quite different from that taken by the court of appeals in Rabidue.
In Rabidue, the plaintiff alleged that she was offended by the sexual comments
and conduct of her co-workers, including being referred to by sexually
offensive epithets and having to work in an area filled with pornographic
pictures and drawings.36 There, the court of appeals explained that whether
actionable harassment was established depended on "the personality of the
plaintiff and the prevailing work environment," citing with approval to the
following statement of the district court:
[Il]t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and
language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and
girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change
this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in
the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of
America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring
33 Davis, 858 F.2d at 351 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34 Id. at 350.
35 Id.
36 See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615. The specifics of the plaintiffs allegations are not
set forth in the majority opinion and can only be found in the opinion of the dissenting
judge. Id. at 623-24 (Keith, J., dissenting).
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about a magical transformation in the social mores of American workers. 7
The Davis court's apparent concern that the standards it had adopted for
sexual harassment cases might be inappropriate for judging claims of racial
harassment may reflect a number of possible concerns. It is possible that the
panel of the court of appeals in Davis simply disagreed with the panel decision
in Rabidue, as was suggested by the concurring and dissenting judge in
Davis,38 and therefore seized the opportunity to avoid the effects of the
standards adopted in that earlier case. It is also possible that the Davis court
truly believed that racial and sexual harassment were sufficiently distinct forms
of discrimination to justify the application of different legal standards.
Both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Harris, the lower
courts have been quite divided on the question of whether analogies between
race and sex are useful or appropriate in determining the merits of workplace
harassment claims. A number of courts have been accepting of analogies drawn
between racial and sexual harassment, apparently recognizing and giving
weight to similarities between those types of behavior. For example, in one of
the first lower court cases to recognize that a sexually hostile working
environment could violate Title VII, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Bundy v. Jackson39 explicitly drew an analogy
between racial harassment and sexual harassment:
Racial or ethnic discrimination against a company's minority clients may
reflect no intent to discriminate directly against the company's minority
employees, but in poisoning the atmosphere of employment it violates Title
VII. Sexual stereotyping through discriminatory dress requirements may be
benign in intent, and may offend women only in a general, atmospheric
manner, yet it violates Title VII. Racial slurs, though intentional and directed at
individuals, may still be just verbal insults, yet they too may create Title VII
liability. How then can sexual harassment, which injects the most demeaning
sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and which always
represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy, not be
illegal?40
This court, recognizing that the effects of sexually harassing conduct can be
as damaging to women as racially harassing conduct is to members of minority
37 Id. at 620-21.
38 See Davis, 858 F.2d at 351 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to the majority's apparent "distaste for this court's opinion inRabidue").
39 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (characterizing issue of whether sexual
harassment itself constitutes discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment as a "novel question" and noting that "no court has as yet so held").
40 Id. at 945.
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groups, concluded that both types of conduct should be subject to the same
regulation and prohibition.
The concurring judge in Swenson v. Northern Crop Insurance, Inc.,41 in
considering whether a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress could
be based on the existence of sex discrimination by the employer, also compared
the effects of racial and sexual discrimination. She reasoned:
Is sex discrimination fairly regarded as "atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community"? The answer must derive not alone from the act of
sex discrimination but from the impact of that act on its victim. Sex
discrimination debases, devalues and despoils. When we cannot do anything to
overcome another's criticism, hatred or contempt, we are, in effect, struck
twice: first, by the act and, second and equally devastating, by the realization
that we are helpless to undo that act, overcome it or change it. This is
particularly true in a workplace.... Discrimination is not a tale of hurt
feelings, unkind behavior or inconsiderate conduct by one against another. That
it may insult is irrelevant; that it strips its victim of self-esteem, self-confidence
and self-realization is the nub of its evil and the stuff of its outrageousness. As
a subscriber to Oliver Wendell Holmes'[s] belief that experience (not logic)
fuels the engine of the law, and as a member of a class that has been subjected
to discrimination, I find it difficult to understand how, at least, some members
of the jury, whom we would all agree are reasonable members of their
community, would not agree that sex discrimination, like race discrimination,
goes beyond all bounds of decency and is truly atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community4 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in
Bilbrey v. Werts Novelty Co.,43 in holding that harassing conduct did not have
to be sexual in nature to constitute sexual harassment, also drew an analogy
between racial harassment and sexual harassment, this time focusing on the
motivation behind the two types of conduct:
The "entire spectrum of disparate treatment' encompasses abuse or harassment
that is directed at an individual because of his or her gender. Consider for
example a group of minority workers whose employer was racist and regularly
battered them because of their minority status. Could anyone seriously be heard
to argue that such behavior would not give rise to a claim of racial harassment
based on a hostile working environment? Of course not. If this is so, then the
same holds true for sex discrimination. That the focus of the discrimination has
shifted from race, color, or nationality to gender is of no consequence; an
employer who is abusive towards men or women because of their sex is every
41 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993).
42 d. at 188 (Levine, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
43 881 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
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bit as culpable under Title VII as the battering racist.4
The court's point is that sexual harassment and racial harassment are equally
unlawful under Title VII because they are both motivated by discriminatory
intent toward protected groups. Just as racial harassment can be motivated by
race without being explicitly racial in nature, sexual harassment can be
motivated by gender without being explicitly sexual in nature.
Some courts, however, seem to have had more difficulty recognizing non-
sexual conduct as potentially sexually harassing than they have had recognizing
non-racial conduct as racially'harassing. In Jones v. City of Overland Park,45
the plaintiff, a black female, alleged that a pattern of harassment by fellow
employees was based on both her race and her gender. Some of the conduct
complained of was explicitly racial in nature-she was accused of playing a
"skin game" in connection with complaints about her treatment by co-workers,
she heard that an employee had removed a radio from the office so that the
plaintiff would not play "nigger music," she was referred to as a "nigger," she
was told that she was assigned to the department because of her race, and she
was called "Aunt Jemima." 46 Other conduct was not explicitly racial or sexual
but consisted of rude, intimidating, and insulting treatment. The district court
refused to grant summary judgment for the defendant on the claim of racial
harassment, finding the plaintiff's allegations sufficient to state a claim:
On this record, the Court has little trouble concluding that Jones alleges
facts sufficient to sustain her claim for a racially hostile work environment.
Contrary to the City's characterization, Jones alleges more than just casual and
isolated remarks. While it is true that Jones identifies only four instances in
which race-based comments were made directly to her, the Court's
consideration is not limited to overtly racial acts. Rather, the totality of the
circumstances in this case includes allegations of ongoing intimidation,
sarcasm, and insult which, along with the overtly racial acts, might be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Jones'[s]
employment.47
The district court, however, did grant summary judgment against the
plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment, finding that nothing in the record
supported the plaintiff's allegations of a sexually hostile environment, even
though it refused to grant summary judgment on the sexual harassment claim of
the other plaintiff, who complained primarily of conduct that was not explicitly
44Id. at 375.
45 No. 92-2163-KHV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15238 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 1994).
46 Id. at *4-5.
47 Id. at *5-6.
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sexual in nature. 48 While the district court was willing to recognize the
possibility that the non-racial conduct was racially motivated, it was unwilling,
even applying the deferential standard of summary judgment,49 to conclude that
conduct also may have been motivated by her gender.50
Other courts have more directly taken the position that analogies between
racial harassment and sexual harassment are not appropriate. For the most part
the courts that have taken this position have not adequately explained their
reasoning in reaching this conclusion. For example, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co.,51 in rejecting a claim of same-sex sexual harassment as not stating a claim
under Title VII, expressly rejected any attempt to draw an analogy between
sexual harassment and harassment on the basis of race: "Plaintiff has not here
argued that Title VII should encompass same-gender sexual harassment because
that statute encompasses 'same-race racial harassment.' This court is satisfied
that 'racial harassment' is not a proper analogy for 'sexual harassment' in the
Title VII context." 52
The only support cited by the district court for this statement is a footnote
in a student note in the Duke Law Journal, which reads in its entirety:
The "because of sex"/sexual problem does not appear with regard to
discrimination based on factors other than gender. The problem in the gender
area arises at least partially because the term "sexual" has a meaning other
]than "relating to gender;" it can also mean "relating to erotic desires." This
problem does not arise, for example, in the context of the terms "race" and
48 See id. at *7-11. The conduct complained of by that plaintiff consisted of comments
about her childless status and her living with her husband prior to their marriage, as well as
being called "bitchy" and a "bitch." See id. at *9-10.
49 "The Court considers all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. at *2.
50 'Me court noted:
Although sexual harassment may be aggregated with racial harassment to satisfy the
severity or pervasiveness requirements, Jones simply did not identify any "sexually
harassing conduct" that could be aggregated. Given the absence of any evidence to
support the allegation, Jones is not entitled to bring charges of sexual harassment on the
coattails of her charges of racial harassment just because she happens to be black and a
woman.
Id. at *7 (citations omitted). The district court did not seem to recognize the very real
possibility that the harassment of the plaintiff was motivated both by her race and her sex-
that she did not "just... happen[ ] to be black and a woman." Id.
51 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), aft'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).52 Id. at 834 n.21.
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"racial."53
This footnote, however, is making a statement about the semantic difficulties of
interpreting the word "sexual," not about the appropriateness of drawing
analogies between race and sex in the context of workplace harassment. In fact,
in the same section of his note that contains this footnote, the author explicitly
draws an analogy between gender-based harassment and racial harassment. 54
The concurring judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Barnes v. Coste55 provided somewhat more support for
drawing distinctions between sexual harassment and racial harassment. In the
context of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim in which the female
plaintiff's job had been eliminated because she rejected the sexual advances of
her supervisor, the concurring judge noted:
Sexual advances may not be intrinsically offensive, and no policy can be
derived from the equal employment opportunity laws to discourage them. We
are not here concerned with racial epithets or confusing union authorization
53 Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work
Environment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1361, 1378 n.80.
54 See id. at 1380. In arguing that harassment need not be sexually motivated-as
opposed to being motivated by gender-in order to be actionable under Title VII, the author
argues:
Analogies from the race discrimination context also support this view. Employees
alleging that they have been discriminated against on the basis of race are not denied an
opportunity to seek a remedy simply because ascertaining an employer's motives is
difficult.... Employees who allege that they have been discriminated against on the
basis of gender rather than race should have the same opportunity to prove claims of
impermissibly motivated discrimination.
Id. at 1380-81. The author later adds: "Analogies from early hostile work environment cases
in the context of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination are again instructive on this
point." Id. at 1381. Continuing with the use of analogy, the author argues:
If gender-based harassment is recognized as actionable, employers may wonder whether
calling a female employee, "Honey," or making sexist jokes will lead to liability under
Title VII. It is doubtful, however, whether employers have much question about whether
calling black employees, "Boy," or making racist jokes, if sufficiently patterned, will
lead to such liability. Arguably, the difference is that sexist behavior is perceived as
relatively more acceptable, or as relatively less offensive, than racist behavior in the
workplaces of America. Title VII should not countenance this perception.
Id. at 1396.
55 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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cards, which serve no one's interest, but with social patterns that to some
extent are normal and expectable. It is the abuse of the practice, rather than the
practice itself, that arouses alarm 56
What the concurring judge seems not to have recognized is that a claim of
sexual harassment necessarily constitutes a claim of "abuse of the practice" and
that, to the extent that sexual advances in the workplace are unwanted or
coerced and interfere with the working environment of women subjected to
them, the policy of the antidiscrimination laws, if really aimed at gender
equality in the workplace, should serve to discourage them.
In addition, in spite of this judge's assertion that sexual advances are part of
"normal" social patterns, he presumably would not take the position that
coerced sexual advances are also "normal" or serve anyone's interests other
than those of the harasser. In addition, to the extent that the judge's distinctions
between racial harassment and sexual harassment are based on his
characterization of sexual advances as "normal," presumably he would not
have reached the same conclusion about other forms of sexual harassment, such
as use of sexually offensive epithets directed at women.
To the extent that rejection of analogies between sexual harassment and
racial harassment is based on the greater societal acceptance of sexually related
behavior than of racially related behavior outside of the workplace, that
reasoning is inconsistent with the purpose of antidiscrimination laws in general
and of Title VII in particular. Much of the workplace behavior prohibited by
Title VII, whether of a sexual or racial nature, had been socially accepted
before the enactment of the statute; that very fact made enactment of the statute
a matter of considerable controversy and spirited debate. In addition, just
because behavior may be acceptable-or accepted-outside of the workplace
does not make it acceptable within the workplace. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained in the case of King v. Hillen:57
[N]o principled argument supports the view that sex-based offensive behavior
in the workplace is immune from remedy simply because it may be culturally
tolerated outside of the workplace. The purpose of Title VII is not to import
into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate
the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to
implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment.
The reasonableness of sex-based conduct is determined from the perspective of
eliminating "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womein in
56 Id. at 1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
57 21 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 58:819
ANALOGIZING RACE AD SEX
employment. 58
One of the principal purposes of the antidiscrimination laws has been to
challenge the prevailing social view-about the role of women and minorities, as
well as the aged and the disabled, in the workplace; a plurality of the United
States Supreme Court has announced that "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group." 59 Accordingly, it is no more
reasonable to expect that female employees will be sexually accommodating or
tolerant of sexual demands or conduct imposed upon them by their employers
and co-workers than it is to assume that black employees will be subservient
and racially deferential in their workplace dealings.
Courts have looked to the common purpose of Congress in enacting Title
VII to eliminate both race and sex discrimination from the workplace as
grounds for applying the same standards to both racial and sexual harassment
claims. For example, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona in Stingley v. Arizona6° rather summarily concluded that racial and
sexual harassment claims should share the same standards because "Title VII
hostile environment claims are founded on the same principles whether based
on race or sex. "61 While this court might be faulted for its lack of analysis, its
presumption of the appropriateness of the analogy between race and sex might
be excused by the close similarity between the congressional treatment of race
and sex under Title VII. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurrence in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,62 other than situations in which the bona fide
occupational qualification defense applies, Title VII equally prohibits
discrimination based on race and gender.
Justice Ginsburg's conclusion that the existence of the bona fide
qualification defense to claims of sex discrimination but not race discrimination
is irrelevant in the area of sexual and racial harassment seems obvious. The
bona fide occupational qualification defense, which allows consideration of sex
when that characteristic is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise," 63 has been narrowly interpreted to apply only
to characteristics that affect the ability of an employee to perform his or her
58 Id. at 1582.
59 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
60 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
61 Id. at 428.
62 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also supra text accompanying
note 29.
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
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job.64 It is difficult to imagine that anyone would seriously assert that allowing
sexually related conduct to exist in the workplace is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of businesses or is necessary to job performance, at least with
respect to businesses and jobs other than those whose very purpose is to "sell
sex." 65 If consideration of the hundreds of sexual harassment cases decided by
the courts in the last few decades tells us nothing else, those cases confirm that
the continued existence of sexually related conduct in the workplace does
nothing to further the business-related activities of the employers, but instead
creates disruption and inefficiency in those workplaces. Even truly consensual
sexual and romantic relationships in the workplace do not increase the harmony
of the workplace but lead to resentment and claims of favoritism.66
B. Differences and Similarities Between Race and Sex
The threshold issue in considering the appropriateness of drawing analogies
between race and sex with respect to workplace harassment claims is whether
the two types of harassment are sufficiently alike to justify the use of the
analogy. Use of an analogy makes little sense and serves little purpose if the
categories being compared share few common characteristics. Indeed, the key
assumption behind the use of analogy is that the different categories or classes
being compared do in fact have much in common. On the other hand,
suggesting that racial harassment and sexual harassment are legally analogous
types of conduct is not the same thing as suggesting that those types of conduct
are identical, either in historical context, current experience, or motivation.
There are, indeed, both similarities and stark contrasts between sexually
motivated and racially motivated harassing behavior.
From a historical point of view, there are certain similarities between the
treatment of women, both white and non-white, and minorities of both genders.
In some aspects, women and minorities share a common history of deprivation
64 See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200-06 (1991) (holding that infertility cannot
be required as a condition of employment in positions involving lead based on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense, on the grounds that fertile women are as able to make
batteries as men and infertile women).
65 Indeed, there would appear to be some question as to whether the bona fide
occupational qualification defense should be allowed even for businesses in the sex-selling
business, given that use of the defense in such a situation would perpetuate the very sexual
stereotypes and views of the proper role of women that Title VII was enacted to counteract.
That topic, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
66 See, e.g., DeCinto v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986)
(male respiratory therapists challenged action of male supervisor in designing promotion
standards in order to favor female applicant with whom he was romantically involved).
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of legal and political rights. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court in
Frontiero v. Richardson,67 in considering the issue of whether classifications
based on sex should be subject to strict scrutiny under constitutional analysis,
noted similarities between the historical treatment of women and minorities:
[Tlroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society
was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War
slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied
the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of
their own children. And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in
1870, women were denied even that right--which is itself "preservative of
other basic civil and political rights'-until adoption of the Nineteenth
Amendment half a century later.68
On the other hand, the historical denial of equal rights to women, the
traditional subordination of women to men, and even the misogynous attitudes
of some men is not the same, and has not left the same legacy, as slavery,
segregation, and centuries of racial hatred. Frederick Douglass graphically
illustrated this point in his plea for white women to support black suffrage even
in the absence of women's suffrage:
When women, because they are women, are dragged from their homes
and hung upon lamp-posts; when their children are tom from their arms and
their brains dashed upon the pavement; when they are objects of insult and
outrage at every tun; when they are in danger of having their homes burnt
down over their heads; when their children are not allowed to enter schools;
then they will have [the same] urgency to obtain the ballot.69
With respect to the treatment of women and minorities in the workplace
during somewhat more recent history, Professor Gunnar Myrdal in his book An
American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem Democracy7 o drew
67 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
68 Id. at 685 (citations and footnote omitted). The plurality went on to note that women
continued to face pervasive discrimination in the workplace as well as in society in general.
See id. at 686. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), in the context of invalidating as
unconstitutional the use of gender-based peremptory challenges to potential jurors, a majority
of the Supreme Court cited with approval use of the analogy between race and sex by the
Frontiero plurality. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135-42.
69 ANGEIA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 82 (Vintage Books 1983) (quoting 2
HisroRY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE 382 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Charles Mann
1887)).
7 0 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN D.EMmA: TBE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
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explicit parallels between the treatment of women and the treatment of blacks in
the 1940s, noting the "striking similarities" between the two groups on a
number of fronts, including their treatment in the workplace:
The most important disabilities still affecting her status are those barring her
attempt to earn a living and to attain promotion in her work. As in the Negro's
case, there are certain "women's jobs," traditionally monopolized by women.
They are regularly in the low salary bracket and do not offer much of a career.
All over the world men have used the trade unions to keep women out of
competition. Women's competition has, like the Negro's, been particularly
obnoxious and dreaded by men because of the low wages women, with their
few earning outlets, are prepared to work for. Men often dislike the very idea
of having women on an equal plane as co-workers and competitors, and usually
they find it even more "unnatural" to work under women. White people
generally hold similar attitudes toward Negroes. 71
Professor Myrdal also noted certain similarities between the treatment of
women and blacks with respect to what he refers to as "personal relations" that
may have a bearing on issues involved in workplace harassment. He noted:
In personal relations with both women and Negroes, white men generally
prefer a less professional and more human relation, actually a more
paternalistic and protective position-somewhat in the nature of patron to client
in Roman times, and like the corresponding strongly paternalistic relation of
later feudalism. As in Germany it is said that every gentile has his pet Jew, so
it is said in the South that every white has his "pet nigger," or-in the upper
strata-several of them. We sometimes marry the pet woman, carrying out the
paternalistic scheme. But even if we do not, we tend to deal kindly with her as
a client and a ward, not as a competitor and an equal. 72
The aversion of many men to working with women as equals and the tendency
of some men to treat women with a greater familiarity and paternalism than
characterizes their dealings with other men, noted by Professor Myrdal in the
1940s, appears to continue to characterize current dealings between men and
women. For example, the results of a number of studies about gender fairness
and the courts indicate that a substantial percentage of female lawyers report
that male lawyers call them by their first names while referring to male lawyers
by titles and surnames and that male lawyers make comments about the
physical or sexual appearance of women. 73
DEMOCRACY (20th anniv. ed. 1962).
71 Id. at 1077.
72 Id. at 1078.
73 See Pamela Coyle, Taking Bias to Task, 82 A.B.A. J., April 1996, at 63, 65-66
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With respect to the experience of harassment, individuals who have been
sexually harassed do not necessarily have the same experience, emotional or
otherwise, as individuals who have been subjected to racial harassment. Many
women, including members of minority racial and ethnic groups, have been
conditioned to view sexual behavior directed toward them as other than hostile
or at least as ambiguously motivated. 74 Many women have also been led to
believe that they are responsible for the sexually harassing behavior directed at
them, so that their experience of sexual harassment may be complicated by
feelings of guilt.75 This same type of confusion is less likely to be experienced
with respect to racially harassing conduct because that conduct is generally
experienced, at least by its recipients, as unambiguously hostile.76
In some situations, however, the experience of men and women who have
been sexually harassed has much in common with the experiences of men and
women who have been subjected to racial harassment. Social science research
indicates that the targets of sexual harassment and the targets of racial
harassment suffer similar physical and psychological harms. Among the effects
reported by those subjected to racial harassment, including racial epithets and
racial hate speech, are rapid pulse rate, hypertension, headaches, dizziness,
social withdrawal, and chronic depression, sometimes leading to psychosis and
nervous breakdown. 77 The physical and psychological symptoms reported by
(reporting results of Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice, which indicated that 65% of
women lawyers answering survey indicated that male lawyers sometimes or more frequently
referred to female but not male lawyers by their first names and that male lawyers made
comments about only women lawyers' physical or sexual appearance).
74 See THE GOvERNOR's TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL HARAsSmENT, SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
BUILDING A CoNsENsus FOR CHANGE, FINAL REPORT SuBMIrEn TO GOVERNOR MARIO M.
CuoMo 69-70 (1993) (noting conversations with Latina and Asian women who reported that
much of the behavior that constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment may be accepted
as normal in their community or causes confusion because sexual approaches are seen as
aspects of admiration).
75 See Peggy Crull, The Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job, in AcADEMIc
AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 133, 141-42 (Michele A. Paludi & Richard B.
Barickman eds. 1991) (many women who are targeted for sexual harassment may feel guilty
that they in some way caused the behavior because "[g]irls' education to male sexuality
includes the message that they are responsible for controlling male sexual behavior"). See
also Tsm GOvERNOR's TASK FORCE ON SExuAL HARASSMENT, supra note 74, at 13-16
(reporting that one of the persistent myths about sexual harassment is that victims are to blame
for being harassed).
7 6 Although the perpetuators of racial harassment often attempt to excuse their conduct
as a "joke," individuals who are subjected to racially offensive comments, pictures, and
gestures report that the conduct is not perceived as funny, but rather as offensive and
threatening. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
77 See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
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individuals who have been subjected to sexual harassment are similar to the
effects reported by targets of racial harassment and include headaches,
backaches, nausea, weight loss or gain, insomnia, depression, and
nervousness.
78
The manner in which women react to sexual harassment and minorities
react to racial harassment and the reasons for those reactions may also have
common causes. It is likely that one's present perceptions are shaped and
influenced by past experiences, and white women, minority women, and
minority men, at least to an extent, share similar histories and experiences of
discrimination. 79 This history and continuing experience of discrimination may
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2336-37 & nn.83-84 (1989).
78 See Jill Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance
Traveled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445, 456-57 (1981); U.S. MERrr
SYSrEMs PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARAssMENT iN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: Is IT A
PROBLEM?, 81-82 (1981). For a more detailed discussion of the effects of sexual harassment
on women, see L. Camille H6bert, supra note 9, at 41, 44.
79 Commentators who have focused on the differences between racism and sexism have
reached different conclusions about the relative importance of race and sex in our society.
Professor Richard Wasserstrom seems to suggest that sexism is actually a more pervasive evil
in our society than is racism:
[S]exism could plausibly be regarded as a deeper phenomenon than racism. It is more
deeply embedded in the culture, and thus less visible. Being harder to detect, it is harder
to eradicate. Moreover, it is less unequivocally regarded as unjust and unjustifiable. That
is to say, there is less agreement within the dominant ideology that sexism even implies
an unjustifiable practice or attitude. Hence, many persons announce, without regret or
embarrassment, that they are sexists or male chauvinists; very few announce openly that
they are racists. For all of these reasons sexism may be a more insidious evil than
racism, but there is little merit in trying to decide between two seriously objectionable
practices which one is worse.
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581, 590-91 (1977).
Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues that sexism is as serious a problem as racism
when she asserts that "[tJo argue that sex oppression is a pale sister of racial oppression, so
that even to compare them mocks the degradation of blacks and minimizes the violence of
racism, severely underestimates the degradation and systematic brutality, physical as well as
emotional, that women sustain every day at the hands of men." CATHARWE MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORmNG WOMEN 129 (1979).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, dissenting in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127
(1994), argued that race and sex are sufficiently different to justify the application of different
standards because of the greater severity of racial discrimination:
Racial groups comprise numerical minorities in our society, warranting in some
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have much to do with the way that women and minorities experience racially
and sexually harassing behavior. Past experience causes the targets of
discrimination and violence to see what may appear to others as trivial and non-
threatening behavior as anything but. As Professor Matsuda writes in
explaining the effect of racist speech on the targets of that conduct: "Members
of target-group communities tend to know that racial violence and harassment is
widespread, common, and life-threatening; that 'the youngsters who paint a
swastika today may throw a bomb tomorrow."' 80 Similar conclusions have
been drawn about the reaction of women to sexually harassing conduct.
Women, for whom sexually abusive conduct is not an unknown or uncommon
experience, may tend to see "minor" harassment as threatening in a way that
men are less likely to construe that behavior.81 As explained by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady:82
[M]any women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share.
For example, because women are disproportionately victims of rape or sexual
assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual
behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may
understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to
violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may yiew
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or
the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.83
That this fear on the part of women is not groundless or the result of hysteria is
demonstrated by a number of litigated sexual harassment cases in which verbal
sexual harassment and physically harassing conduct has culminated in sexual
situations a greater need for protection, whereas the population is divided almost equally
between men and women. Furthermore, while substantial discrimination against both
groups still lingers in society, racial equality has proved a more challenging goal to
achieve on many fronts than gender equality.
Id. at 154-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
80 Mar J. Matsuda, supra note 77, at 2330-31.
81 See SusAN D. CLAYTON & FAYE J. CROSBY, JUSnCE, GENDER, AND AFFRMATiVE
ACTON 90 (1992) (describing study indicating that women who had previously been subjected
to sexual assaults had much harsher attitudes toward sexual harassment than women who had
not previously been victimized; also suggesting that women who have themselves been
subjected to sexual harassment may be less likely to engage in blaming the victim of
harassment and therefore be less tolerant of harassment).
82 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
83 Id. at 879 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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assault04 and rape.85
Even in situations in which women do not explicitly fear that other forms of
sexual harassment will lead to rape or sexual assault, women's experience may
validate their concerns that "mild" forms of harassment will lead to more
"serious" sexually harassing behavior. Studies have indicated that generalized
sexualization of the workplace is correlated with more instances of sexual
harassment directed at women. For example, viewing of pornographic pictures
has been associated with the tendency of male subjects to treat women as sexual
objects in their behavior. Similar tendencies on the part of men to treat women
in a sexualized manner and to engage in stereotyping about women have been
found to be associated with tolerance of profanity and sexual jokes in the
workplace. 86 As one female employee testified in a sexual harassment case
brought by a female co-worker, the employee "steered clear of men who
worked where such pictures [of nude and partially nude women] were
displayed because she came to expect more harassment from those men."8 7
Differences and similarities also exist with respect to the motivation behind
sexually and racially harassing conduct in the context of the workplace. In at
least some situations and with respect to certain types of harassment, the
84 See Reed v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 93-5031, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3485 (6th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (per curiam) (plaintiff, who initially was subjected to a forced kiss,
questions about her marital status, and "professions of love" from her supervisor, was later
sexually assaulted by hint when he forcibly pushed her down on his desk, put his hand up her
shirt, pulled her underwear over, and put his finger in her vagina); Ficek v. Griffith Lab.
Inc., No. 93 C 6178, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1153 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1995) (female plaintiff
alleged pattern of sexually harassing behavior, including repeated comments about her
buttocks and underwear, being called sexually offensive names, being made the object of
sexually offensive graffiti, and being sexually assaulted by a co-worker in the parking lot
behind a bar).
85 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (allegations of sexual
harassment by female plaintiff against bank manager included his actions of asking her to
have sexual relations, fondling her, exposing himself to her, and forcibly raping her); Gary v.
Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (pattern of sexual harassment of female plaintiff by her
supervisor-which included his making crude references to her body, regularly indicating his
desire to have sex with her, fondling her breasts, and putting his hand between her legs-
ultimately culminated in rape), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1996); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff alleged pattern of harassment by co-workers
included comments about the plaintiff's breast size, sexually explicit messages from co-
workers, a co-worker's repeated attempts to hug and kiss her, and her subsequent rape at the
workplace by an unknown assailant).
86 See testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, Professor of Psychology at University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1502-05 (M.D. Fla. 1991), describing studies upon which her testimony was based.87 Id. at 1500 (testimony of Lawanna Gail Banks).
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perpetrators of racial and sexual harassment may have very different motives
and purposes for engaging in harassing behavior. Although some forms of
sexual harassment may in fact be attributable to misguided attempts to show
affection or to initiate a romantic relationship rather than to hostility to
women, 88 it seems unlikely that any forms of racial harassment can be
reasonably explained in such a manner.
On the other hand, sexual harassment of women is often motivated by some
of the same factors and considerations that prompt racial harassment of
minority men and women. While sexual harassment consisting of sexual
advances is often seen as motivated by sexual attractiveness rather than
hostility, the facts of some sexual harassment cases cast serious doubt on those
assumptions. Instead, even sexual advances often appear to be motivated by the
same hostility toward women-or hostility toward women in certain positions in
the workforce-as are other forms of sexually harassing behavior. For
example, the female plaintiff in Conwell v. Robinson89 was subjected to a
pattern of sexually and racially harassing behavior by co-workers who
88 Although some sexually related behavior that occurs in the workplace might be
categorized as attempts at establishing a social or romantic relationship and, therefore, as
socially acceptable behavior, truly consensual sexually related conduct, standing alone, will
rarely result in the filing of a sexual harassment case, at least by the participants in such a
relationship. Some commentators and courts who argue against taking too stringent a stand
against sexually related conduct in the workplace argue that many persons meet their future
spouses in the workplace and that too stringent a standard would preclude or chill the creation
of such relationships. However, if a social or romantic overture is welcomed and the
relationship mutually desired, the likelihood of a claim being made is quite remote unless later
conduct by one of the parties imposes job-related benefits or burdens based on the continued
existence of such a relationship, such as when an employee claims that he or she was
threatened with job-related consequences for refusing to continue the relationship. Indeed, I
am not aware of a single litigated sexual harassment case in which a claim has been asserted
simply because an employer or supervisory employee made a single verbal, nonthreatening
overture of a social or romantic nature toward an employee, who declined that overture.
Sexual harassment claims based principally on the existence of romantic overtures virtually all
involve contentions that the overture was accompanied by a threat of job-related
consequences, that the overture was accompanied by unwelcome and offensive touching, or
that the overture was made repeatedly even though the person making the overture was told
that the recipient of the overture was uninterested. Most sexual harassment claims, however,
are not based on what most people would view as normal romantic overtures; instead, those
claims involved allegations of offensive sexually related comments and name calling,
offensive touching, and attempts at coercing participation in sexual conduct. After all, use of
sexually derogatory language towards women, placement of sexually explicit cartoons and
pictures in the workplace, and sexual assault can hardly be characterized as either affectionate
or romantic.
89 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1994).
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repeatedly expressed their intent to "get the bitches out of here." 90 Much of the
harassment consisted of undermining the authority of and using sexually and
racially offensive epithets toward the plaintiff and her female co-workers at the
residential facility for male juveniles, which had traditionally employed only
men in their positions. In addition, however, the plaintiff was sexually
propositioned by one of her co-workers, who, when she rebuffed his advances,
grabbed at her chest and ripped her blouse. 91 The context of this sexual
advance leaves little doubt that it was motivated by the same animus and
hostility as prompted the rest of the sexual and racial harassment of the plaintiff.
Similarly, the circumstances surrounding the sexual conduct directed
toward the female plaintiff in Beardsley v. Webb92 also strongly suggest that it
was motivated by the supervisor's resentment of the plaintiffs position in the
workforce. The plaintiff was the highest ranking female employee in the
sheriffs office when her direct supervisor began to refer to her as "honey" and
"dear" in front of her subordinates, to touch her during roll call, to ask her
about her underwear and her use of birth control, and to suggest that they
engage in sexual activity in the parking lot. When she complained about his
behavior, he told her that "she had chosen to work 'in a field primarily
occupied by men' and that if she didn't like it she could 'just get out." 93
An examination of the history, motivations, and effects of sexually
harassing and racially harassing conduct suggests that, while race and sex are
by no means identical and are different in some important ways, there are
parallels between race and sex, particularly in the context of workplace
harassment, that provide justification for drawing analogies between racial
harassment and sexual harassment for purposes of developing and applying the
legal standards that apply to such claims.
C. Sexual and Racial Harassment of Minority-Group Women
A study of harassment of persons subject to both racial and sexual
harassment provides added support for use of analogies between race and sex in
considering workplace harassment claims, because those cases demonstrate the
interconnections and similarities between racial harassment and sexual
harassment. After all, for certain groups of people, harassment may be neither
just sexual nor just racial; instead, the harassment to which they are subjected
may have both racial and sexual overtones and motivations. Accordingly, the
similarities and overlap between racial and sexual harassment may be best
90 Id. at 698.
91 See id.
92 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994).
93 Id. at 528.
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understood in the context of harassment of minority-group women, who are
likely to face both kinds of harassment. 94
I do not mean to suggest, however, that minority-group women who are
sexually or racially harassed have the same experiences as white women who
are subjected to sexual harassment or as minority-group men who are subjected
to racial harassment. The complexities of the intersection of race and gender
create a number of unique circumstances with respect to harassment of minority
women. For example, the type of harassment directed at black women often
reveals a combination of race and sex at work, so that the motivation for that
behavior cannot properly be attributed to "just" race or "just" sex. Professor
Kathryn Abrams argues that use of epithets such as "nigger bitch" conveys
what she refers to as "a kind of racialized sexual hostility, or sexualized racial
hostility."95
A number of workplace harassment cases reflect the combination of racial
and sexual harassment directed at minority women. In Brooms v. Regal Tube
Co. ,96 the black female plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a combination
of racial slurs and sexual innuendo by her supervisor, the employer's human
resource manager. Among the harassing incidents to which the plaintiff was
subjected were being shown a pornographic picture depicting an interracial act
of sodomy and being told that the picture depicted the "talent" of a black
woman and showed the purpose for which she had been hired. At another time,
the supervisor showed the plaintiff what the court characterized as "a racist
pornographic picture involving bestiality" and told her that the picture
"depicted how she 'was going to end up."' 97 In Carter v. Sedgwick County,
Kansas,98 the plaintiff's supervisor boasted to her of his sexual conquests of
"black pussy" and presented her with a picture of a photograph of a black male
with an elongated penis, which he captioned "Long Dong Silver." 99 In Stingley
v. State ofArizona,100 an African-American woman alleged that she was called
"a black bitch slut."' 0 ' The black female plaintiff in Splunge v. Shoney's,
Inc.102 complained of a wide variety of verbal sexually related conduct by her
94 See infra text accompanying notes 96-103.
95 Katbryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479,
2501 (1994).
96 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
9 7 Id. at 417.
98 705 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 929 F.2d 1501
(10th Cir. 1994).
9 9 Id. at 1476.
100 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
101 Her black male co-worker was also referred to by racist "nicknames" such as
"watermelon eater," "naphead," "nigger," "spearchucker," and "token." Id. at 426 n.3.
102 874 F. Supp. 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
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manager, including being told that he "wouldn't mind having [him] a black
woman" and that black women "know how to screw." 103
It should not be surprising that harassment of minority-group women,
particularly harassment that is perpetuated by majority-group men, is both
racial and sexual in nature. Aggression against and attempts to intimidate
minority women traditionally has, at least from the days of slavery, taken
sexual forms. As Professor Angela Davis explains in her book Women, Race &
C/ass, rape was used by American slave owners to terrorize and dominate slave
women and to demoralize slave men and, after the abolition of slavery, by
terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan as part of the effort to thwart
the movement for black equality. 104
Somewhat more surprising may be the fact that harassment of minority-
group women by minority-group men may also have racial overtones.
Although courts express a good deal of skepticism about whether members of
minority groups or members of a particular gender are capable of
discriminating against members of their own group or gender, 0 5 some of the
harassment directed at black women by black men does have racial overtones;
some of that harassment is explicitly racial in nature. For example, the black
female plaintiff in Cornwell v. Robinson10 6 alleged harassment by both white
men and black men. The harassment by both groups was both sexual and racial
in nature:
There were certain staff that just did not want me on the unit. I was
referred to as a bitch. Of course, that was the primary one.
103 Id. at 1267.
104 See DAvs, supra note 69, at 24-25, 175-76 (1981). Professor Davis also describes
the use of rape against Vietnamese women during the Vietnam War as a weapon of political
terrorism. See id. at 24.
105 See Abrams, supra note 95, at 2522-23 & n.168 (discussing reluctance of courts to
accept claims of intragroup discrimination); see also Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) ("[Tlhis Court holds that Title VII does not provide a
cause of action for an employee who claims to have been the victim of sexual harassment by a
supervisor or co-worker of the same gender .... Where, as here, the alleged harasser and
the alleged victim are both of the same gender, the language of the statute would be strained
beyond its manifest intent were the Court to hold that under these facts there has been
discrimination 'because of... sex.'"); Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation
Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (noting, in context of claim by black male of
race discrimination by his black female supervisor, that a plaintiff who alleges intraracial
discrimination bears a "relatively unique and difficult burden of proof").
106 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1994).
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And then I was referred to as a dog fucking bitch, a black whore. The
white guys called me a black whore. The black guys called me a black ho, a
black stank bitch, a black stank ho, variations of, you know, things like
that. 107
These instances of racial and sexual harassment against minority-group
women suggest the similarity between racially harassing conduct and sexually
harassing conduct. A black woman who is referred to as a "black whore" or
107 Id. at 698 (quoting Trial Transcript at 1238).
The harassment of minority-group women by members of their own minority group
raises a number of unique issues. For example, when a black woman is sexually harassed by
a black man or black men, that woman may encounter additional disincentives to complain
about or otherwise report that sexually harassing behavior. A black woman complaining about
sexual harassment by a black man may encounter pressure from inside the black community
not to "air your dirty laundry in public," THE GOVERNOR's TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL
HARA mNT, supra note 74, at 69, or to refrain from inflicting harm on the black
community by reinforcing racial stereotypes about black men as sexual predators. See
Kimberld Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of
Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENr-GENDEP/NG POwER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL,
CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALY 402, 420 (Toni
Morrison ed. 1992) [hereinafter Whose Story?]; Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHi. L. FORUM 139, 162-63 [hereinafter
Demarginalizing Race and Sex]. Professor Crenshaw gives the example of the treatment of
Professor Anita Hill in the black press after making allegations of sexual harassment against
now-Associate Justice Clarence Thomas: "In many such accounts Hill was portrayed as a
traitor for coming forward with her story. Many commentators were less interested in
exploring whether the allegations were true than in speculating why Hill would compromise
the upward mobility of a black man and embarrass the African-American community."
Crenshaw, Whose Story?, supra, at 420. Because charges of sexual misconduct, including
rape, traditionally have been used as a method of oppressing black men, black women may
face considerable internal conflict about making and pursuing charges of sexual harassment
against black men who harass them. See DAvIS, Rape, Racism and the Myth of the Black
Rapist, in WOMEN, RACE & CLASs, supra note 69, at 172-201 (describing the ways in which
accusations of rape have been used to justify lynching and other forms of oppression of black
men, contributing to the reluctance of black women to support anti-rape movements). In
addition, black women who are subjected to harassing conduct by black men may suffer
additional and more serious harm because of a sense of betrayal by a member of their own
community. See, e.g., I. Elena Featherston, On Becoming a Dangerous Woman, in SEXUAL
HARAsSMENT: WOMEN SPEAK OuT 71 (Amber Coverdale Sumrall & Dena Taylor eds.
1992), reprinted in BEvERLY BALOs & MARY LouIsE FELLOWs, LAw AND VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATEhRIALS ON SYSrEMs OF OPPRESSION 285, 288 (Carolina
Academic Press 1994) (providing description by black female author of her feelings of
betrayal as a child due to sexual conduct by older brother of a black playmate).
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"black bitch" is not complimented by the sexual reference while being insulted
by the racial reference. When she is shown a picture of racist pornography, she
is unlikely to draw a distinction between the insult that is being made to her on
racial grounds and the sexually offensive nature of the conduct. A black woman
who is told of her white supervisor's desire and interest in "black pussy" or of
his view that black women "know how to screw" is likely to feel the
degradation of both the racial and the sexual reference. Professor Kimberl6
Crenshaw has noted that the sexual harassment of minority women frequently
has racial overtones; she suggests that this racial component to sexual
harassment may serve to confirm the discriminatory nature of sexual
harassment: "Racism may well provide the clarity to see that sexual harassment
is neither a flattering gesture nor a misguided social overture but an act of
intentional discrimination that is insulting, threatening, and debilitating." 108
IllI. THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL ANALOGIES BETWEEN RACE AND SEX
In most cases, courts considering claims of racial harassment, sexual
harassment, or both, do not draw or address explicit analogies between race
and sex. Instead, in most cases, the silent or implicit effects of analogizing
racial harassment and sexual harassment can be seen only by the courts' use of
the same or similar standards for both types of claims. However, some
conclusions can be drawn about the effects of analogizing race and sex in the
context of workplace harassment claims even when courts do not explicitly
draw those analogies in connection with their resolution of harassment claims.
The courts have decided hundreds of cases dealing with racial harassment
and sexual harassment in the thirty-some years since the enactment of Title
VII. 109 In analyzing the manner in which courts have decided claims of racial
harassment and sexual harassment, and in judging the effects of analogizing
108 Crenshaw, Whose Story?, supra note 107, at 402, 412.
109 Although there was initially some doubt as to whether Title VII's prohibition on
discrimination in employment reached discriminatory conduct that did not result in tangible
detriment to employment opportunities or benefits, it is now well established that
discriminatory harassment is actionable whether or not tangible harm results; the intangible
harm caused by a hostile or abusive working environment is sufficient to constitute a violation
of Title VII. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Even before the
Supreme Court decisions in Meritor and Harris, a number of lower courts had held that Title
VII protected against discriminatory working environments as well as against more tangible
discriminatory actions. See Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (stating that Title VII grants an employee the right to "working environment free of
racial intimidation"); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-45, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(recognizing viability under Title VII of discriminatory environment claims in context of
sexual harassment, without regard to loss of tangible job benefits).
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race and sex, several aspects of those claims need to be examined." 0 Although
parallels between the courts' treatment of racial harassment and sexual
harassment can be found with respect to virtually all elements of workplace
harassment claims, the effects of analogizing racial harassment and sexual
harassment can be seen most clearly with respect to four aspects of those
claims: (1) the unwelcomeness of the harassing conduct; (2) the perspective
from which actionable harassment is judged; (3) the requirement of severity or
pervasiveness; and (4) issues of employer liability for harassing conduct. With
respect to a fifth element of workplace harassment claims-the requirement that
the harassment be discriminatory on the basis of a protected characteristic-the
potential effects of analogizing race and sex can be seen. Each of these aspects
of workplace harassment claims will be discussed below.
A. Welcomeness of Harassing Conduct
A critical element of a claim of sexual harassment is the requirement that
the conduct complained of be "unwelcome.""1 The courts have stressed that
sexually related conduct is actionable only if the target of that conduct can be
said not to have incited the conduct and then only if the conduct is deemed to be
offensive to him or her.112 Accordingly, a significant number of sexual
harassment cases decided by the courts deal with welcomeness and address
issues ranging from the prior sexual activities of the harassed employee"13 to
110 There are a number of cases alleging racial and sexual harassment that are discussed
in such a summary fashion-with the courts generally concluding that no actionable
harassment has been shown-that it is difficult to assess the merits of the claims and therefore
the validity of the courts' assessments of the claims. Those cases are not discussed in this
analysis because of these difficulties of interpretation and analysis. It is possible, however,
that even the willingness of courts to grant summary disposition of claims of sexual and racial
harassment reflects the level of seriousness with which such claims are viewed.
111 As the United States Supreme Court stressed in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 68 (1986), "fIhe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome.'"
112 The term "unwelcomeness" has generally been defined as having two components:
"Mhe challenged conduct must be unwelcome 'in the sense that the employee did not solicit
or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or
offensive.'" See EEOC: PoucY GumANCE ON SEXUAL HARAsSMENT (Mar. 18, 1990) (citing
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)), reprinted in [8 Fair Empl.
Prac. Man.] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405 (Mar. 19,1990).
113 See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1322 (8th
Cir. 1994) (noting that district court had rejected the plaintiffs testimony that she had been
offended by sexual activities at office functions "because she had admitted having had a
relationship with a married man"; court of appeals held that district court had erred as a
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what she wore to work,114 to what she said to co-workers,"15 including how she
responded to sexually harassing conduct by co-workers116 and whether or not
she told or laughed at certain jokes. 117
In contrast, welcomeness has traditionally not been an issue with respect to
racially harassing conduct. As the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
explained in its Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.:
"Outside the context of harassment that is sexual in nature, welcomeness is
seldom an issue. If one is subjected to taunts based on ethnicity, religion, etc.,
there is ordinarily no question that the comments are perceived as abusive." 118
However, in cases articulating the standard for actionable racial
harassment, at least some courts have indicated that one of the required
matter of law in focusing on the plaintiffs private life); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993) (district court found that sexual harassment of the
plaintiff, including use of sexually offensive terms toward the plaintiff and the repeated sexual
advances of the president of the company, were not offensive because the plaintiff had posed
nude in a magazine; court of appeals reversed).
114 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (indicating that
evidence of "a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress" is "obviously relevant" to
the issue of whether the conduct complained of was unwelcome).
115 See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Tubine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1994)
(district court found that harassing conduct directed toward the plaintiff-including use of
derogatory sexual epithets toward her, defacing her equipment and clothing, sabotaging her
work by hiding her equipment, the action of her co-workers in exposing themselves to her-
was not unwelcome because she used the terms "fuck head" and "dick head"; court of
appeals reversed).
116 See Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989). The district court
found that sexually harassing conduct toward the female plaintiff was welcome because, on
three occasions, she responded to harassing conduct with arguably sexual references: she told
co-worker that he had never had "a good woman"; she called a co-worker a "mother fucker"
after being called a "bitch"; and she called a co-worker a "whoremong[ ]er" after a sexual
remark was made about her on a radio transmitter. The court of appeals reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment, noting that "[t]hese comments were limited replies to an
onslaught of sexual remarks and gestures." Id. at 1273 & n.4, 1275.
117 See, e.g., Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D. Miss.
1986) (holding that plaintiff could not demonstrate the existence of a hostile environment
based on the actions of her supervisor in making derogatory remarks about women, sexually
propositioning her, and excluding her from professional meetings based on her gender, in part
because of the testimony of her co-workers that she "often made jokes about sex"), aff'd
without opinion, 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987).
118 Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (March 8, 1994),
reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at D-1 (March 9, 1994). One cannot help
wonder, however, why it is that the same assumption would not be made about sexually
related "taunts"; one would imagine that being subjected to sexual epithets and derogatory
remarks would be perceived to be as abusive as being the target of racial or ethnic taunts.
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elements is that the target have been "subject to unwelcome racial
harassment."119 This requirement has been borrowed directly from the standard
for sexual harassment claims I20 and appears to be a direct result of drawing
analogies between sexual harassment claims, for which "welcomeness" is often
seen as an important issue, and racial harassment claims, for which
welcomeness has generally not been considered to be a relevant issue.
The result of borrowing the requirement of "unwelcomeness" from sexual
harassment cases and applying that standard to racial harassment cases is not
entirely clear. In most racial harassment cases, even when the requirement of
unwelcomeness is articulated as an element of the claim, that element is
presumed to be met. For example, in Johnson v. Teamsters Local Union No.
559,121 in a case involving a black male plaintiff's claim that his union had
created a racially hostile environment consisting of threats, insults, and racial
epithets on the bathroom walls, the singing of "slave songs" in his presence,
and other threatening and derogatory conduct on the part of union members,
the extent of the district court's analysis on the issue of unwelcomeness
consisted of the following statement: "he was subject to unwelcome racial
harassment as evidenced by the graffiti and taunting."1 22
While most of the racial harassment cases decided to date have in fact spent
little time in determining whether or not the harassing conduct was unwelcome
to the target of the harassment, it is by no means unthinkable that a court would
undertake that analysis, particularly when unwelcomeness is stated as a formal
element of the claim. After all, not only have a number of courts considered the
issue of whether sexually demeaning and derogatory conduct is unwelcome, but
some of those courts have actually concluded that such conduct is not unlawful
because it was welcome. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Reed v. Shepard 23 held that the female plaintiff, a jail
employee, could not state a cause of action for sexual harassment because the
119 See, e.g., Johnson v. Teamsters Local Union No. 559, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1150 (D. Mass. 1995); Motley v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., No. 1:94-CV-639, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7420, at *5 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F.
Supp. 1509, 1512-13 (D. Me. 1991), vacated in part, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991).
120 The authority cited for this standard in Johnson v. Teamsters Local Union No. 559,
67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1152-53, is Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986). The authority cited for this standard in Motley v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., No. 1:94-
CV-639, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7420, at *5, is Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986). The court in Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D.
Me. 1991), indicated that the standard for racial harassment was based on the EEOC's
regulations defining sexual harassment. Id. at 1513 n.5.
12167 Fair Empl. PraC. Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D. Mass. 1995).
122 Id. at 1153.
123 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
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conduct to which she was subjected-including being physically assaulted by
being punched in the kidneys, being handcuffed to the drunk tank in the jail,
being regularly subjected to remarks about oral sex, having her head grabbed
and forcefully placed in the laps of her male co-workers, having a cattle prod
placed between her legs, being maced, and being handcuffed to the toilet and
having her faced pushed into the toilet-was welcome. The court concluded
that this pattern of conduct was welcomed because the plaintiff had used
offensive language, had shown co-workers her abdominal scar from her
hysterectomy, had given suggestive gifts to male co-workers, and sometimes
did not wear a bra under her t-shirts. 124 A court that could conclude that a
woman was "enthusiastic[ally] receptive" 125 to such demeaning and hostile
sexually derogatory conduct might well be able to convince itself that a member
of a minority group might enjoy-and even encourage-similarly demeaning
and abusive racially oriented conduct.
Some of the racial harassment cases decided by the courts, while not
specifically framing their analysis in terms of the welcomeness of the harassing
behavior, have used language suggestive of that used in sexual harassment cases
to indicate welcomeness. For example, in Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co.,126 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in upholding the district
court's finding of no actionable racial harassment, noted the lower court's
finding that the plaintiff had also used racial slurs. 127 This is precisely the type
of conduct used in a number of sexual harassment cases to justify a finding of
welcomeness on the part of a harassed employee.128
A dissenting opinion in another case also uses language suggesting that
racially offensive conduct was incited by the conduct of the black employee at
whom the conduct was directed; the issue of whether harassing conduct is
"incited" by the target of that conduct has been considered to be a critical
element of "welcomeness." 129 The dissenting judge in Newton v. Department of
124 See id. at 486-88.
125 Id. at 491.
126 683 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982).
127 See id. at 924. The court's opinion does not elaborate on the nature of these racial
slurs allegedly made by the plaintiff, nor does it provide any information about the context in
which they were made. The court does not even indicate what racial group the slurs were
made against-that is, whether they were directed against the plaintiffs white co-workers or
some other group. Nor does the court give any indication of whether the plaintiffs use of
unspecified racial slurs might have been provoked by the admittedly frequent, racially
derogatory conduct directed toward the plaintiff. This context, while not excusing the
plaintiff s own use of racial slurs, would clearly be relevant to the issue of whether such use
indicated welcomeness.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
129 See supra note 112 for definition of "unwelcomeness."
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the Air Force,130 in arguing that a supervisor had been inappropriately removed
from his position because he burned a cross in front of black employees whom
he supervised, indicated that the incident was "inevitable" in light of racial
comments made by the black employee at whom the cross burning was
targeted; the black employee apparently referred in a "joking" manner to the
white supervisor as a "white hillbilly mother fucker" and a "Klan mother
fucker."131 Elsewhere in the opinion, the dissenting judge indicated that the
supervisor had "permitted himself to be in an improper relationship with an
employee" and that his "misguided effort to participate in that relationship"
lead to his cross-burning activities. 132 The unstated assumption of the dissenting
judge that the black employee had incited the racially offensive conduct toward
himself-that he had "asked for it"-alnost leaps from the written opinion.
In the context of the issue of "welcomeness," it appears that use of
analogies between racial and sexual harassment, whether explicit or implicit,
has the potential to make it more difficult to establish claims of racial
harassment. This potential effect is created because the felt need to use the same
or similar standards in both types of cases causes courts to raise questions,
previously thought inappropriate or even unthinkable, about whether minority
group members are responsible for the harassing conduct directed toward them.
B. The Perspective for Judging Actionable Harassment
A heavily contested issue in the area of sexual harassment is the choice of
the perspective from which sexually harassing conduct is to be judged. The
essence of the dispute is whether the existence of actionable sexual
harassment-whether the conduct is sufficiently serious to be actionable-is to
be judged from the perspective of a gender-blind "reasonable person" or from
the perspective of a gender-specific "reasonable woman." 133 Although the
United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. made passing
reference to the standard of a reasonable person, 134 it is by no means clear that
the Court's opinion should be read to have resolved conclusively the choice of
130 85 F.3d 595 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
131 Id. at 600 (Plager, j., dissenting).132 Id.
133 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in &Wxton v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993), framed the issue as the choice
between "the perspective of a reasonable woman as opposed to a genderless reasonable
person." Id. at 534 n.13. One cannot help but wonder how decisionmakers are to determine
what the perspective of a "genderless" person is likely to be, given that all decisionmakers
will have a gender.
134 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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the appropriate perspective for judging claims of sexual harassment. 135 Lower
courts interpreting Harris reflect the belief that this issue remains open. 136
The issues involved in choosing between the "reasonable person" and the
"reasonable woman" standard are many. Among those issues are whether the
choice of perspective makes any difference in identifying actionable harassment
and, if it does, which perspective is the proper one. 137
Curiously, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in the case of
J.E.B. v. Alabama138 provides some support for recognition of a gender-
specific standard, at least with regard to the issue of whether men and women
might in fact have different perspectives relevant to the resolution of certain
legal issues. In that case, a majority of the Court found that use of a peremptory
challenge to exclude members of one gender from the jury violated the equal
protection clause. The majority rejected the suggestion that it was permissible to
rely on gender-based stereotypes in excluding potential jurors on the basis of
sex, regardless of whether there was any truth supporting those stereotypes.
The dissenting justice, however, argued that gender may in fact make a
difference with respect to the issue of perspective: "The two sexes differ, both
biologically and, to a diminishing extent, in experience. It is not merely
'stereotyping' to say that these differences may produce a difference in outlook
135 Compare Abrams, supra note 95, at 2525 & n.182 (concluding that the United States
Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable woman" standard in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.),
with L. Camille Hlbert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv.
565, 593-94 (1995) (arguing that Harris should not be read as an adoption of the "reasonable
person" standard over the "reasonable woman" standard, in light of the failure of any
member of the Court to discuss any of the implications of the choice between those
standards).
136 See, e.g., Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454 & n.8, 1456 (7th
Cir. 1994) (noting that "reasonable person" standard may include "consideration of the
perspective of persons of the alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin,
age, or disability" and applying "reasonable woman" standard in judging whether
environment was objectively hostile or abusive); King v. Hillen,21 F.3d 1572, 1582-83
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that the Supreme Court in Harris "touched on the subject of
reasonableness," but indicating that it was not necessary to "enter the debate" about the
appropriate standard; referring to the "reasonable woman" standard); Currie v. Kowalewski,
842 F. Supp. 57, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Although the Harris case did not explicitly decide
whether a reasonable person or a reasonable woman (or victim) standard applies, certainly
any reasonable woman or person would have found the defendant's behavior to be offensive
and repulsive."), aft'd, 40 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1994).
137 For a more detailed discussion of the issues involved in the choice between a gender-
blind and a gender-specific standard for sexual harassment, see H~bert, supra note 135, at
592-606.
138 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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which is brought to the jury room." 139
Justice Rehnquist sought to distinguish use of gender in selection of jurors
from use of race:
Under the Equal Protection Clause, these differences mean that the
balance should tilt in favor of peremptory challenges when sex, not race, is the
issue.... Accordingly, use of peremptory challenges on the basis of sex is
generally not the sort of derogatory and invidious act which peremptory
challenges directed at black jurors may be. 140
What Chief Justice Rehnquist fails to understand, however, is that the
experiences of members of minority groups-which, at least with respect to
certain issues, may differ significantly from the experiences of majority group
members-may also influence their perspectives. 141
However, that men and women may have different perspectives on issues
for which they may have disparate experiences, including issues of sexual
harassment, does not support the exclusion of members of either sex from being
decisionmakers on such cases, as apparently suggested by the dissent in J.E.B.
That women may perceive as hostile and abusive conduct that men are more
likely to view as trivial does not mean that men-or women-should be
excluded from juries or panels of judges deciding such cases. 142 Instead, the
issue is whether, when the standard to be applied considers whether conduct is
sufficiently serious to be considered abusive and hostile, the perspective of
those most likely to recognize the harmful nature of the conduct on its targets
should be given special consideration.
The resolution of this issue of perspective in the context of sexual
harassment claims will undoubtedly have an effect on how this issue is resolved
in connection with claims of racial harassment. If a gender-blind "reasonable
13 9 Id. at 155 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140 Id.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
142 Nor should male supervisors be allowed to escape responsibility for failing to
remedy sexual harassment by a claim that they, as men, are unable to recognize the types of
behavior that are offensive to women, as attempted by the supervisor in Carrv. Allison Gas
Turbine Division, 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff's immediate supervisor in that
case testified that "even though some of the offensive statements were made in his presence,
not being a woman himself he was not sure that the statements would be considered offensive
by a woman." Id. at 1010. Quite apart from the credibility issues involved in this supervisor's
claimed inability to determine that women might be offended by use of the terms "whore,"
"cunt," and "pussy" to refer to the female plaintiff, use of any standard that does not
completely exclude the perspective of women will require both male and female supervisors
to be aware of what conduct is offensive to both men and women.
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person" standard is ultimately adopted in connection with claims of sexual
harassment, then it also seems likely that a race-blind "reasonable person"
standard will be deemed to be appropriate for claims of racial harassment.
In the context of claims of racial harassment, the question is whether the
existence of a hostile or abusive working environment is to be judged from the
perspective of a race-blind reasonable person or from the race-specific
perspective of a reasonable person who shares the racial identity of the target of
harassment. There are really two questions that are important in resolving this
issue. The first is whether the choice of perspective will have any effect on the
determination of whether harassing conduct is actionable. The second question
is, assuming that the choice of perspective has any bearing on the manner in
which conduct is perceived, which perspective is appropriate for judging racial
harassment claims.
With respect to this first issue, it seems reasonable to assume that one's
experiences tend to have an effect on the way that one views the world;
therefore, women, who are disproportionately the targets of sexual harassment,
might be assumed to view sexual harassment differently from men. Similarly,
members of minority groups, who are more likely to have been on the
receiving end of racial harassment and other forms of racial discrimination than
non-minority-group members, might be assumed to have different perspectives
on racial harassment from their white counterparts. As Professor Richard
Delgado indicates in his article discussing the issue whether nonwhite scholars
have a special "voice" on issues of civil rights, it is no stranger to expect that
such a perspective exists than it is to hold that "the patient in the dentist's chair
is the one who knows when it hurts." 143 Professor Martha Minow rejects the
notion of a single perspective on legal issues, indicating that "[w]hat interests
us, given who we are and where we stand, affects our ability to perceive." 144
Similarly, Professor David Kretzmer argues that the harm caused to individuals
based on racist speech is based on that individual's experience with antagonism
toward the group of which he or she is a member:
It is not surprising, therefore, that a derogatory remark about the ethnic group
to which an individual belongs, in a society with no history of antagonism
toward that group, and when the individual himself has no experience of
antagonism toward his own ethnic group, may cause no harm at all. Thus, for
example, the statement in America that all whites should be deprived of the
vote is unlikely to cause much (or any) harm to whites. On the other hand,
when the speech at issue is associated with a history of antagonism towards the
143 Richard Delgado, When A Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA.
L. REv. 95, 100, 104 (1990) (arguing that racism plays a substantial role in the lives of
nonwhite scholars and gives them a special "voice" on issues of civil rights).
144 Martha Minow, supra note 2, at 46.
[Vol. 58:819
ANALOGIZING RACE AND SEX
groups concerned, the harm to the individual may be significant. Consider the
position of the Holocaust victim subjected to Nazi propaganda or the black
bombarded with Ku Klux Klan propaganda. 14 5
The importance of perspective as shaped by experience was recognized by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Daniels v. Essex
Group, Inc. 146 In that case, among the incidents alleged by the plaintiff to have
been racially harassing was graffiti on the bathroom walls, which said "All
niggers must die," "KKK," and "hi Bob KKK." The district court described
the effect that mention of the KKK would have on blacks with the following
words:
The most violent threats to black society are well known to come from that
organization. Furthermore, there is no more chilling image than that of a black
man being hung by the KKK. Any reasonable person who is targeted by such a
terrorist organization over a period of time without any protection from his
employer would surely suffer similar adverse effects as those experienced by
Daniels. 147
The court of appeals concluded that "[p]lainly, any black would find this graffiti
threatening. "148
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Maine in
Hartis v. International Paper Co.,149 drawing a direct analogy between race
and sex, 150 recognized that the different social experiences of racial minorities
and nonminorities is relevant to their perspectives on racially harassing conduct:
145 David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 445, 465
(1987).
146 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991).
147 Id. at 1274 (quoting Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 553, 560 (N.D.
Ind. 1990)).148 Id.
149 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
150 Te district court noted:
To give full force to [the] basic premise of antidiscrimination law, and to [the]
recognition of the differing perspectives which exist in our society, the
standard for assessing the unwelcomeness and pervasiveness of conduct and
speech must be founded on a fair concern for the different social experiences
of men and women in the case of sexual harassment, and of white Americans
and black Americans in the case of racial harassment.
Id. at 1515.
19971
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Black Americans are regularly faced with negative racial attitudes, many
unconsciously held and acted upon, which are the natural consequences of a
society ingrained with cultural stereotypes and race-based beliefs and
preferences. As a result, instances of racial violence or threatened violence
which might appear to white observers as mere "pranks" are, to black
observers, evidence of threatening, pervasive attitudes closely associated with
racial jokes, comments or nonviolent conduct which white observers are also
more likely to dismiss as non-threatening isolated incidents. The omnipresence
of race-based attitudes and experiences in the lives of black Americans causes
even nonviolent events to be interpreted as degrading, threatening, and
offensive. Even an inadvertent racial slight unnoticed either by its white
speaker or white bystanders will reverberate in the memory of its black
victim. 151
Assuming that choice of perspective may make a difference in determining
what type of racially related or racially motivated conduct is sufficient to be
actionable, the second issue involves a choice between perspectives. This
choice, of course, is not value free. The choice between perspectives is closely
related to the goals sought to be obtained. To the extent that protection is sought
to be provided to prevailing workplace norms, a race-neutral standard is more
attractive, because that choice of perspective causes to be unlawful only that
conduct that all persons-black and white, minority and nonminority-clearly
recognize as harmful and abusive. On the other hand, the choice of a race-
specific and race-conscious standard reflects a desire to challenge current
prevailing norms by making clear that conduct seen as common and trivial to
whites may be profoundly damaging and harmful to racial minorities. 152 That
is, the issue is whether the abusiveness of racial taunts and other racially related
conduct is to be judged from the perspective of one conditioned to expect racial
abuse and animus (and, therefore, more sensitive-or sensitized-to racially
harassing conduct) or from the perspective of one unlikely to have directly
suffered the effects of racial bias and therefore who is less likely to recognize its
hurtful and damaging nature. As Professor Mari Matsuda suggests in her article
defining what should be categorized as racist speech: "Rather than looking to
151 Id. at 1515-16 (citing DERUCK BELL, AND WE APE NOT SAVED 181-85 (1987);
Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 80, at 2326-35; Patricia
J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 401,406-13 (1987)).
152 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526-27 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (indicating, in sexual harassment context, that standards reflecting the particular
sensitivity of women to harassing behavior is necessary "[t]o implement fully the promise of
Title VII").
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the neutral, objective, unknowing, and ahistorical reasonable person, we should
look to the victim-group members to tell us whether the harm is real harm to
real people." 153
There are, however, some potential risks associated with adoption of a
race-specific standard for judging claims of racial harassment, just as there are
risks associated with the adoption of a gender-specific standard for judging
claims of sexual harassment. Professor Martha Chamallas sees a similar danger
in use of the "reasonable black person" standard as that posed by use of the
"reasonable woman" standard:
The reasonable woman's perspective might backfire if courts, lawyers, and
other legal actors lose sight of the critique of objectivity and instead treat the
women's view as in women's minds only, thereby underscoring women's
separateness from the real world of work and men. There is also the danger
that the reasonable black person's perspective could be used in a repressive
way to blame the victim for failing to adopt the "white" interpretation of
behavior that would simultaneously avoid a lawsuit and cut down on the
number of occasions racial meanings would attach to actions. 154
These risks, however, would be largely eliminated or at least decreased by the
appropriate application of these standards by decisionmakers sensitive to the
special experiences of women and minorities with respect to workplace
harassment. Some decisionmakers have shown this heightened awareness of the
truly harmful effects of sexually harassing behavior. 155
A number of courts have suggested that a race-specific standard is
appropriate for judging claims of racial harassment. For example, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Johnson v. Teamsters
Local Union No. 559,156 a case in which the black plaintiff had been subjected
to racial taunts and racially derogatory graffiti by fellow union members, held
that the conduct created a hostile work environment because "any reasonable
black person in [the plaintiff's] situation would have found the work
153 Matsuda, supra note 80, at 2368.
154 Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constnctions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in
Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WomiEN & L. 95, 123 (1992).
155 In some cases, this heightened awareness appears to be associated with exposure to
expert testimony concerning women's perspectives on sexual harassment. See Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-09 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (court's
discussion of the effects of sexual harassment on women and reliance on expert testimony). In
other cases, sensitivity to the effects of sexually harassing behavior on women may be
attributable to the decisionmaker's own experiences of discrimination, as reflected in the
dissenting opinion of Judge Damon Keith, an African-American judge, in Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986).
156 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D. Mass. 1995).
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environment hostile or abusive." 157 Similarly, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey in Martinez v. National Broadcasting Co.158
indicated that, in order for a plaintiff to state a claim of actionable racial
harassment, the plaintiff was required to show that the conduct complained of
"was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person of plaintiff's race
believe that the conditions of employment were altered and the working
environment was hostile or abusive." 159 The United States District Court for
the District of Maine in Harris v. International Paper Co. 160 agreed that the
appropriate standard for judging a hostile environment racial harassment case
brought by black men was that of a "reasonable black person," reasoning that
Title VII's concern with remedying the effects of harassing conduct on its
victims requires that the fact finder "walk a mile in the victim's shoes."161
The effects of analogizing race and sex in the context of racial harassment
claims may be most profound in connection with the issue of choice of
perspective for judging harassment claims. While use of the analogy may help
clarify that women have a unique perspective on sexually harassing behavior
similar to the unique perspective of racial minorities on racial harassment,
analogizing race and sex on this issue may instead have quite damaging effects
for racial harassment claims. If courts follow the lead of the Harris Court in
applying a single standard for actionable harassment to all claims of
discriminatory harassment, 162 adoption of a gender-blind "reasonable person"
standard in sexual harassment cases, based on the view that explicit
consideration of gender is irrelevant or unnecessary in judging the claim of
harassment, undoubtedly would result in the adoption of a race-blind reasonable
person standard in racial harassment cases, also suggesting the irrelevance of
the perspective of race in the experience of racial harassment. Application of
such a standard by decisionmakers not sensitive to the relative positions of
racial minorities and racial majorities in our society is likely to result in a
finding that quite serious and damaging conduct is not sufficient to be unlawful.
A recent case indicates the potential for this danger. In Newton v.
Department of the Air Force,163 the United States Court of Appeals for the
157 Id. at 1153.
158 877 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1994).
159 Id. at 231.
160 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
161 Id. at 1516. The district court seemed to be suggesting that while the "reasonable
black person" standard was appropriate for the black male plaintiffs complaining of racial
harassment, a different standard might be appropriate for a black woman complaining of
harassment. See id. at 1516 n.12.162 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
163 85 F.3d 595 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Federal Circuit considered the claim of a white supervisor challenging his
dismissal for burning a cross in an area in which black employees were
working. The supervisor argued that termination was inappropriate because he
had only been joking with a black employee. The majority of the court of
appeals upheld the removal, noting the serious racial nature of the conduct
engaged in by the supervisor:
The burning of a cross, for whatever reason, cannot be justified. It is not a
quaint artifact of our nation's past that can be perceived without emotion. It
represents bigotry that our society has combatted for many years but that still
exists today. The appellant himself noted in his testimony that, on the same day
that the incident at the facility was reported on television, another cross burning
was reported in Oklahoma. 164
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, would have held that the termination
of the supervisor was inappropriate. The dissenting judge not only suggested
that the black employee was responsible for the cross burning incident because
of his admittedly inappropriate racial comments to his supervisor, 165 but also
trivialized the significance of the cross burning by describing the incident as
"the stant of burning in front of Lewis two popsicle-like chemical mixing sticks
shaped in the form of a cross." 166 The dissenting judge also suggested the lack
of harm caused by that incident by noting that "[i]t was not until several days
later, perhaps after Lewis described the event to others, that Lewis decided he
was offended and initiated a complaint." 167 Finally, the dissenting judge
dismissed the employer's action of removing the supervisor who committed the
cross burning as an attempt to be "politically-correct.'1 68
The tone and language of the dissenting judge's opinion unmistakably
conveys his belief that, as asserted by the supervisor, this cross burning was
only a joke, did not evidence any racially discriminatory intent, and was
164Id. at 597.
165 The dissenting judge noted that the black employee who was the target of the cross
burning had called his supervisor a "white hillbilly mother fucker" and a "Klan mother
fucker" and had remarked that "I'll bet that hillbilly mother fucker is running the KKK." Id.
at 600 (Plager, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
167 Id. A review of the majority opinion, however, reveals that the cross burning
incident occurred on Saturday and was reported to another supervisor early in the day on
Monday. The report occurred early enough in the day to allow the supervisor to whom the
report was made to question a number of employees about it and "later that day" place the
offending supervisor on non-duty status. A delay of less than two days, over a weekend,
would not seem to merit the dissenting judge's indication that it took "several days" for the
black employee to "decide" that he was offended. Id.
16 8 Id. at 601.
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without racial harm to the black employees who observed it. If an incident as
racially charged and as reminiscent of racial hatred and animus as the burning
of a cross can be dismissed as harmless and nondiscriminatory behavior, then
other similar racial behavior could also be dismissed as attempts at humor and
not actionable under Title VII.
Given that the choice of courts between different perspectives for judging
workplace harassment claims is likely to go hand-in-hand with the adoption of
either gender- and race-blind or gender- and race-specific standards for both
types of claims, the effect of analogizing race and sex in this area is unclear.
The use of analogies might serve to convince courts of the relevance of specific
standards for both types of claims, making it somewhat easier to establish
actionable harassment. On the other hand, courts might instead adopt "neutral"
standards for each type of claim, increasing the risk of perpetuating current
norms of workplace conduct.
C. How Bad Is Bad Enough?
The United States Supreme Court has twice articulated the standard for
actionable workplace harassment, both times in the context of a case involving
allegations of harassment that were sexual in nature. 169 However, although
sexual harassment was at issue in both of those cases, the standard for
actionable harassment articulated in those cases apparently also applies to
claims of harassment based on other protected characteristics, such as racial
harassment. 170 Lower courts dealing with claims of harassment following
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.171 generally have concluded that the legal
standards governing claims of racial harassment and sexual harassment are the
same.
172
In defining the standard for actionable harassment under Title VII, the
United States Supreme Court in Harris held that not all discriminatorily
harassing conduct is sufficiently serious to violate Title VII's prohibition against
169 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); Meitor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
170 For a discussion of the language in Harris that suggests the appropriateness of a
single standard for workplace harassment, see supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
171 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
172 See, e.g., Martinez v. National Broad. Co., 877 F. Supp. 219, 230-31 (D.N.J.
1994) ("Whether the hostile work environment is due to discrimination based on race or sex,
the law is the same."); Jones v. City of Overland Park, No. 92-2163-KHV, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15238, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 1994) ("[tlhe Harris standard applies to both types of
hostile work environment claims"); Coleman v. Tennessee, 846 F. Supp. 582, 589 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993) ("Mhe standard for governing hostile work environment harassment is the same
regardless of whether the harassment is sexual or racial.").
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discrimination. In that case, the Court set forth the following standard:
"[M]ere utterance of an... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee". . . does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to
implicate Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's
purview....
But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one
that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and
often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees
from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.
Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.173
In some sexual harassment cases, quite serious conduct-including the
regular use of epithets such as "whores," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits" to refer to
women, informing a female employee that all she needed was "a good lay,"
and posting of pornographic pictures in common work areas-has been
dismissed as merely annoying and as having a "de minimis" effect on the work
environment. 174 In reaching this conclusion, reliance has been placed on the
"undisputed" fact that "in some work environments, humor and language are
rough hewn and vulgar." 175 Another court has described instances in which a
173 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (citation omitted).
174 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (characterizing
use of obscenities toward female employees as merely annoying and display of posters of
mde women as having a "de minimi effect" on the work environment).
175 Id. at 620 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D.
Mich. 1984)).
There is a tendency to discount the harmfulness of behavior that is part of the prevailing
culture. As Celia Kitzinger states in her description of what she terms the "frequency double-
bind":
Mhose highlighting the social problem are quizzed as to the frequency with which the
alleged problem (say, sexual harassment) occurs. If they produce low frequencies, their
opponents claim that as the problem is rare, it isn't 'really' a problem. If they produce
high frequencies, their opponents claim that as the alleged 'problem' happens all the
time, it can't really be very serious, but is just 'part of life'.
Celia Kitzinger, Anti-lesbian Harassment, in RmHmNIG SExuAL HARAsSMENT 125, 129
(Clare Brant & Yun Lee Too eds. 1994).
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supervisor made physical and verbal sexual advances to a female subordinate,
including repeatedly placing his hand on her upper leg and thigh, lunging at
her, and forcibly kissing her, as "relatively limited" and "merely offensive."1 76
In judging the severity of racially harassing conduct, courts have looked to
the standards set forth in Harris, as well as other sexual harassment cases, to
determine if the conduct complained of could be characterized as sufficiently
severe to be actionable. While it is natural that lower courts would look to the
language of the Harris Court for guidance in judging harassment claims, some
of the implications of the adoption of standards from sexual harassment cases
for racial harassment cases are disturbing.
The decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan in Motley v. Parker-Hannifan Cogp.177 graphically illustrates the
dangers of analogizing racial harassment and sexual harassment in judging the
severity or pervasiveness of harassing conduct. In that case, the black male
plaintiff complained of three incidents in support of his claim of racial
harassment. The most serious incident involved a doll-like figure hung in his
workplace, described as a "black African American hung in effigy." The other
incidents involved racially related graffiti on the bathroom wall directed at the
plaintiff and a flier for a company event altered by shading of the face and
labeling the flier with the plaintiffs name. Although the district court also
justified its grant of summary judgment for the employer on lack of proof of
respondeat superior liability, the court first f6und that the conduct of which the
plaintiff complained was not sufficiently serious to constitute actionable
harassment. In justifying this conclusion, the court relied expressly on a
previously decided sexual harassment case for the applicable standard:
It should be noted, however, that this "frequency double-bind" apparently does not affect
all social problems. It is difficult to imagine, for example, decisionmakers concluding that
workplace drug use is not a significant problem because drug use is pervasive in some
workplaces. Instead, the perceived pervasiveness of such use is precisely the argument used to
justify taking stringent action against such use.
17 6 Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993). Sadly, these
cases are not atypical. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir.
1995) (reversing jury verdict for plaintiff on grounds that the male supervisor's comments to
female subordinate, including making grunting sounds as she walked out of office and making
gestures suggesting masturbation, could not reasonably be found to constitute actionable
sexual harassment); Stoeckel v. Environmental Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-
16 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding sexually harassing conduct-including action of male supervisor in
making sexual comments to female subordinate, rubbing her neck and shoulders, touching her
clothing, taking her hand and leading her around the office, and following her into an elevator
and placing his hands on either side of his face to suggest that he was going to kiss her-not
serious enough to be actionable).
177 No. 1:94-CV-639, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7420 (W.D. Mich. May 10, 1995).
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Conduct must be sufficiently severe or persuasive to create an objectively
hostile work environment to come within Title VII's purview. Moreover,
hostile work environment claims "are characterized by multiple and varied
combinations and frequencies of offensive exposures, which characteristics
would dictate an order of proof that placed the burden upon the plaintiff to
demonstrate that injury resulted not from a single or isolated offensive incident,
comment, or conduct, but from incidents, comments, or conduct that occurred
with some frequency." Plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment is
premised on the doll-like figure incident. UnderRabidue, an isolated incident
such as this is insufficient to create an objectively hostile work environment.
Even coupled with the incidents involving the graffiti and the flier, Defendant's
conduct-to the extent, if any, that it is attributable to Defendant-falls far
short of the severity and pervasiveness necessary to create an objectively
hostile work environment. 17 8
Under the standard articulated by the court, a single incident of harassment, no
matter how severe, would be incapable of establishing a hostile or abusive work
environment. Such an interpretation of the standard would mean that an
employee would be required to tolerate at least one incident of racial
harassment, no matter how severe, simply because it comes alone. The
damaging effect of such a rule should be obvious in the context of the Motley
case itself; the simulation in the workplace of the lynching of a black man-
with its attendant statement of racial hatred and animus-is not even unlawful as
long as it happens only once. 179
178 Id. at *6, 7 (citations omitted). In a factually similar case, the district court in Vance
v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 672 F. Supp. 1408 (M.D. Fla. 1987), granted
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the employer in a racial harassment case, finding as
a matter of law that two incidents in which the black female plaintiff found a noose hanging
over her desk could not create a racially hostile work environment. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that both the number and severity of
harassing incidents had to be considered in determining whether actionable harassment had
occurred. See Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989). The
court of appeals went on to conclude that the jury could have properly found the existence of a
racially hostile environment, noting that "[tihe grossness of hanging an object resembling a
noose at the work station of a black female is self-evident." Id. at 1510-11 & n.4.
179 That the employer in this case took prompt action to terminate the employee
responsible for this harassment is irrelevant to this part of the court's holding. The district
court found both that the harassment was not serious enough to be actionable and that the
employer could not be held liable for the harassment because of its prompt remedial action.
See Vance, 672 F. Supp. at 1415. The dual holding of the court, however, suggests that the
conduct complained of by the plaintiff would not have been actionable racial harassment even
if the employer had taken no action to discourage such conduct or had even condoned the
conduct.
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This manner of analysis is a direct result of the use of analogies between
race and sex in judging workplace harassment claims. The requirement of
"severity" or "pervasiveness" seems geared to ensure that "trivial" claims of
sexual harassment not be deemed actionable. Importing this standard into racial
harassment cases threatens to trivialize the harm created by even isolated
incidents of racially hostile conduct.
D. Employer Liability for Harassing Conduct
Another issue that arises in connection with claims of racial and sexual
harassment is the issue of employer liability. Employer liability is not automatic
in those cases in which actionable harassment is shown, even when a
supervisory employee is shown to be responsible for the harassing conduct.
Instead, the courts have looked to some level of notice or other form of
culpability on the part of the employer before finding the employer liable for
the creation of a hostile work environment.
These standards for employer liability for workplace harassment arise out
of the less-than-definitive standards for employer liability articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson.180 In that
case, the Court, while declining to set forth concrete rules for employer
liability, indicated that courts are "to look to agency principles for guidance,"
expressly rejecting the contention that employers should be strictly liable for
sexual harassment engaged in by their supervisors.' 8' The Court's concern
about holding employers strictly liable for the sexually harassing conduct of
supervisory employees most likely reflects concerns similar to those voiced by
earlier courts deciding sexual harassment cases about the appropriateness of
holding employers liable for the sexually related conduct of their supervisors.
For example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in Miller v. Bank ofAmerica182 expressed amazement that employers
could be held liable for sexual conduct on the part of employees:
It is conceivable, under plaintiff's theory, that flirtations of the smallest order
would give rise to liability. The attraction of males to females and females to
males is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at
least a subtle part in most personnel decisions. Such being the case, it would
seem wise for the Courts to refrain from delving into these matters short of
specific factual allegations describing an employer policy which in its
application imposes or permits a consistent, as distinguished from isolated, sex-
180 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
181 Id. at 69-73.
182 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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based discrimination on a definable employee group. 183
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.184 expressed skepticism about
holding an employer liable for what the court characterized as a "physical
attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happens
to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley."1 85
The application of this standard of employer liability has resulted in
incredibly harsh treatment of employees who have been subjected to even the
most severe forms of sexual harassment in the workplace. For example, in
Gary v. Long,186 the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor first promised her job-
related benefits if she had sex with him and, when she refused, threatened to
fire her if she did not submit. The pattern of sexual harassment, which included
his making crude references to her body, regularly indicating his desire to have
sex with her, fondling her breasts, and putting his hand between her legs,
ultimately culminated in rape. The supervisor then threatened the plaintiff with
reprisals if she told anyone about what had happened. When she finally did
report his activities some months later, the employer concluded that there was
no evidence to corroborate her allegations and reassigned the plaintiff to
another facility.'87 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the employer could not be liable for the sexual
harassment that the plaintiff suffered at the hands of her supervisor because the
employer had a policy against sexual harassment, which should have informed
the plaintiff that her supervisor's actions were not authorized by the
employer. 88 Essentially, the court faulted the plaintiff for failing to
183 Id. at 236.
184 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
185 Id. at 556. Similar attitudes about holding employers liable for racially harassing
conduct of employees and supervisors are reflected in early racial harassment cases. For
example, in Johnson v. Buny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the use of racial slurs by co-employees and
supervisors of the black plaintiffs did not violate Title VII, in part because "[s]uch racial slurs
as were present at Bunny Bread were largely the result of individual attitudes and
relationships which, while certainly not to be condoned, simply did not amount to violations
of Title VII." Id. at 1257. The court's reference to "individual attitudes and relationships"
suggests an unwillingness on the part of the court to find Title VII liability for what was
viewed as largely personal, non-work-related behavior.
186 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
187 See id. at 1393-94.
188 See id. at 1398-99. Although the court of appeals noted that an employer can be
strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment, the court found the quid pro quo theory to
be inapplicable because the plaintiff could not show that she in fact suffered an economic
19971
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
immediately report the harassing conduct of her supervisor, in spite of the fact
that she was threatened with adverse consequences by her supervisor, who
presumably appeared to her to have the power to make those consequences
come about. Most ironically, when the plaintiff did report the supervisor's
conduct (as she was faulted for not doing earlier), she apparently was not
believed because no corroborating evidence could be found. Instead. of
disciplinary action being taken against her harasser and rapist, she was
transferred to another position. 189 The court of appeals then upheld the
dismissal of the plaintiffs Title VII claim against the individual supervisor,
finding no basis for individual liability. 190 Essentially, the court of appeals
informed the plaintiff that, although Title VII was clearly violated by the
sexually harassing conduct of her supervisor, no one was liable for that
harassing conduct. 191
injury because of the harassment by her supervisor:
[lIt takes more than saber rattling alone to impose quidpro quo liability on an employer;
the supervisor must have wielded the authority entrusted to him to subject the victim to
adverse job consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual
advances. To hold otherwise would be to impose liability on the employer without
evidence that the supervisor has acted as its agent. Although Gary alleged that Long
repeatedly threatened her with adverse job consequences if she did not submit to his
sexual advances, those threats were not caried out. Accordingly, we hold that Gary has
failed to make out a claim of quidpro quo sexual harassment.
Id. at 1396 (citations omitted).
189 Although the district court never made a determination as to the truth of the
plaintiff's allegations, because the plaintiff's claim was decided on summary judgment, the
court was required to presume that the facts as alleged by the plaintiff were true.
190 See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; see also Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that individual supervisor, who actively participated in sexually
harassing conduct toward the plaintiff, did not constitute an "employer" under Title VII and
therefore could not be held personally liable; the jury had found all defendants other than the
individual supervisor not to be liable for sexual harassment).
191 Not all courts, however, have applied the rules of employer liability for sexually
harassing conduct by employees to excuse employers from liability for such conduct. Rather
than simply accepting any employer remedial action as sufficient to exonerate the employer,
some courts have been more demanding as to the type of remedial actions taken by
employers. See, e.g., Ficek v. Griffith Lab. Inc., No. 93-C-6178, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1153, at *19-21 (N.D. 11. Feb. 1, 1995) (female plaintiff alleged that she had been subjected
to 36 incidents of sexually harassing conduct by her male co-workers, including repeated
comments about her buttocks and underwear, being called sexually offensive names,
placement of sexually offensive graffiti on the walls of the men's restroom, and sexual assault
by a co-worker in the parking lot of a bar; employer's action six months later of holding a
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Although some earlier cases suggested that employers might be more
generally liable for racially harassing conduct of at least supervisory
employees, 192 more recently, the rules of employer liability adopted in
connection with claims of sexual harassment have been held applicable to
claims of harassment on the basis of race. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained in Dennis v. County of Fairfax,193
involving a claim of racial harassment:
In both cases, the general question is the proper extent of an employer's
responsibility for the offensive acts of its employees, an inquiry that implicates
principles of agency law. The particular type of prejudice that generated the
impermissible employee behavior is clearly of little relevance to that question.
For reasons of consistency and logic, then, the notice rule for employer
liability that governs sexual harassment under Title VII should also control
here.194
Accordingly, it appears that rules of employer liability created to prevent
employers from being held liable for what has been perceived to be the
personal and sexually motivated behavior of its employees will also be applied
to insulate employers from liability for the racially motivated and racially
derogatory conduct of supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. As a result,
minority employees subjected to pervasive racial harassment in the workplace
may well find themselves with no cause of action against either their employers
or the supervisors or co-workers participating in the harassment, at least in part
because of the unwillingness of courts to hold employers liable for what they
viewed as sexually motivated, non-work- related conduct.
meeting of its employees to discourage harassment and issuing a new policy statement on
sexual harassment "too little, too late"); see also Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages,
Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding district court's finding of no employer
involvement in showing of videotape of bare-breasted female sales representatives at company
party to be clear error, in light of fact that several area managers were present when videotape
was shown and no one was ever reprimanded for the incident).
192 See Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989)
(indicating that employer could be directly liable for racially harassing conduct of supervisory
employee, without regard to notice); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 999 & n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (indicating that "a supervisor's persistent use of racial epithets would undoubtedly lead
to an employer's Title VII liability" because an employer would actually know or should
know of the conduct, because "a simple order announced by the employer... would obviate
the problem," and because "[niame-calling of any kind is close to abuse, and there is no harm
from inducing its complete avoidance").
193 55 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1995).
194 Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
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E. The Discriminatory Nature of Harassment
The potential-if not yet realized-damaging effects of use of analogy
between sexual harassment and racial harassment can be seen with respect to an
additional element of workplace harassment claims: the requirement that the
harassment reflect discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. One
of the major obstacles facing employees making claims of sexual harassment
has been convincing the decisionmaker that the harassment was based on sex.
In the early days of sexual harassment law, this obstacle seemed almost
insm ountable; the courts seemed intent on finding that sexually related
conduct was directed at women not because of their gender but because of their
sexual attractiveness to the harasser. 195 After the Supreme Court's decision in
Meritor, the lower courts had less difficulty concluding that sexually related
conduct directed against an employee was based on sex, instead seeming to
assume almost automatically that sexually related conduct in the workplace was
motivated by gender. 196
In recent cases, however, some courts appear to be reexaming the issue of
whether sexually harassing conduct is motivated by gender. Many of the cases
raising this issue involve allegations of same-sex conduct. For example, in
Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp.,197 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana, in finding that a sexual epithet directed by one
man against another did not constitute sexual harassment, 198 indicated that the
195 See, e.g., Tomldns v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J.
1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
161, 162, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
196 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). In articulating the
elements of a sexual harassment claim, the court of appeals in Ellison did not even list as a
separate requirement that the harassment be based on sex, instead apparently subsuming such
a requirement within the requirement that the employee show "that he or she was subjected to
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature." Id. at 975-76.
This observation of the analysis of those courts on this issue is not intended as a
criticism. I also believe that sexually harassing conduct reflects discriminatory motives based
on gender. For a discussion of the gender bias behind sexually harassing conduct in the
workplace, see Hdbert, supra note 135, at 568-76.
197 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
198 The male co-worker had called the male plaintiff a "dick sucker." The district court
noted:
While the epithet used and the taunting had a "sexual" component, as do most
expletives, the crucial point is that the "harasser" was not aiming expletives at the victim
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essence of actionable sexual harassment was "gender bias":
The words "sex" and "sexual" create definitional problems because they
can mean either "relating to gender" or "relating to sexual/reproductive
behavior." The two are not the same, but are certainly related and easily
confused. Title VII only recognizes harassment based on the first meaning,
although that frequently involves the second meaning. However, harassment
which involves sexual behavior or has sexual behavior overtones (i.e.,
remarks, touching, display of pornographic pictures)but is not based on gender
bias does not state a claim under Title VII....
It is being the victim of anti-male or anti-female bias that forms the basis
of a Title VII sexual harassment claim, not simply being exposed to "sexual"-
type comments or behavior. Title VII is meant to rectify gender bias in the
workplace, not per se to outlaw foul mouths or obscenities. Sometimes
sexually-explicit comments are evidence of or constitute gender bias, and
sometimes not. 199
While the Vandeventer court's language might be seen as a positive step
towards the recognition of sexual harassment as a form of gender or sex
discrimination, the court's attempt to distinguish between sexual conduct that is
motivated by gender bias and that which is not is troubling. First, the existence
of bias or animus has not been a requirement for a successful discrimination
claim; all that has been required is that the challenged act be based on a
protected characteristic, regardless of the existence, or absence, of aninus. 2°°
Focusing on bias encourages courts to find actionable sexual harassment only in
those situations in which the court can attribute the harassing behavior to
hostility or animus towards women. While much sexually harassing behavior
likely is, in fact, attributable to such hostility,201 courts have tended to see
harassment of a sexual nature as motivated by sexual attraction or attempts at
because of the victim's maleness. He was taunting the victim because he did not like
him; Mr. Feltner's gender was irrelevant. There was no evidence that the abuse was
based on the "harasser's" disdain for the victim's gender. Thus, it was not actionable
under Title VII.
Id. at 1181 n.2.
199 Id. at 1181-82.
200 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987) (holding that union
can be held liable for intentional discrimination for failing to process race-based grievances,
even though union held no racial animus toward minorities).
201 See Mbert, supra note 135, at 568 (discussing denigrating and hostile nature of
many types of sexually harassing conduct).
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humor rather than by gender hostility.202
In addition, acceptance of this distinction would mean that the protection
granted to the target of harassment would be made to depend on the intent-or
perceived intent-of the harasser, rather than on the effect of that harassment on
the target. Sexual harassment is prohibited in employment largely because of
the damaging effects of such harassment to the working environment and to the
employees who must work in that environment, not just because of the specific
intent of the harasser.203 Attempting to distinguish between conduct motivated
by gender and conduct not so motivated will only encourage harassers to blame
their harassing conduct on other motives, even though gender and gender
stereotypes undoubtedly play a role in virtually all sexually harassing conduct.
Even the Vandeventer harasser's use of the sexual epithet "dick sucker" toward
his male co-worker represents an attempt to use a challenge to the target's
masculinity-seen as a critical aspect of gender-as a weapon of insult.2°4
The case of Goluszek v. Smith205 represents another use of gender
stereotype in same-sex sexual harassment. In that case, the male plaintiff, who
had never been married and who still lived with his mother, alleged that he had
been subjected to numerous comments about sex and his sex life, including
being told that he had to be married to work at the company, that he had been
shown pictures of nude women, and that he had been poked in the buttocks
202 See, e.g., Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kansas, 705 F. Supp. 1474, 1476-78 (D.
Kan. 1988) (although the plaintiff testified that she felt humiliated and degraded by the receipt
of sexual "gifts," the court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of
sexual harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because "[tlhe evidence does not indicate that
defendant Cameron gave plaintiff any sexual gifts with the intent to intimidate or harass her"),
aff'd inpart and vacated in part, 929 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1991).
203 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993) (focusing on the
subjective and objective effects of the harassing conduct rather than the specific intent of the
harasser); see also King v. Frazier, 77 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting
arbitrator's conclusion that male employee could not be disciplined for sexually harassing
conduct toward female employees because he did not know that his sexually explicit
comments made to women were wrong and constituted sexual harassment; the court of
appeals held that focus on the harasser's perspective and intent in determining whether sexual
harassment had occurred was inappropriate), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 62 (1996).
204 A classic manner of challenging the masculinity of a man is to label him as "gay,"
just as a classic way of challenging the femininity of the woman is to call her a "lesbian." See
SuzANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 17-20 (Chardon Press 1988),
reprinted in LnsuE BENDEn AND DAAN BRAvEmAN, POwER, PRIVILEGE AND LAw: A CvIm
RIGHTS REA R 252, 258-59 (West 1995); Elvia R. Arriola, "Wat's the Big Deal?" Women
in the New York City Construction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 21, 62 (1990) (describing action of male construction workers
who attacked the femininity of female workers by calling them "dykes").
205 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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with a stick. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, wrongly I believe, concluded that Title VII had not been violated. The
court reasoned that, even though the plaintiff may have been harassed because
he was a male, he could not establish that he was a male working in an "anti-
male environment," which the judge said was the essence of Title VII's
prohibition against sexual harassment. 206 But this plaintiff clearly appears to
have been harassed because of his gender and because of his failure to comply
with the standards of sexuality expected of members of his gender. 207 That is
the essence of sex discrimination.208
The type of reasoning used by the Vandeventer and Goluszek courts also
appears to be having an impact on the standards for sexual harassment claims
outside of the context of same-sex harassment.209 To the extent that the courts
construe sexually derogatory comments and actions of harassers as not based on
gender but rather on personal animosity or some other factor, those courts will
find that the conduct does not constitute actionable sexual harassment under
Title VII. 210 Some courts have in fact reached precisely this conclusion. For
example, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in
Bradshaw v. Golden Road Motor Inn211 granted summary judgment for the
defendant-employer on the female plaintiff's sexual harassment claim,
indicating that the pattern of harassment complained of by the plaintiff was
based on personal animosity between her and her supervisor rather than on sex
discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the court discounted the
supervisor's regular use of the terms "flcking bitch" and "cunt" to refer to the
plaintiff because there was insufficient evidence that these terms were used in
206 See id. at 1456.
207 See Chamallas, supra note 154, at 127 (expressing belief that Goluszek was "singled
out for harassment because he did not conform to the men's image of male heterosexuality").20 8 As a plurality of the United States Supreme Court indicated in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988), "we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group." Id. at 251.
209 Even the court's language in Vandeventer leaves open the possibility of the spillover
effect of this method of viewing sexually related harassing conduct. The court noted: "This
distinction makes little difference when dealing with male-on-female or female-on-male sexual
harassment, at least, it has typically been treated as one and the same." Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (emphasis added).
210 This line of reasoning might ultimately lead courts to conclude that the sexual
comments and conduct of a harasser are based not on gender but on the particular sexual
attractiveness or lack of attractiveness of the target of harassment, returning full circle to the
analysis of some pre-Meritor decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
211 885 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Nev. 1995).
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her presence.212 Although that fact might have been relevant to the issue of
whether use of those terms contributed to the hostile environment experienced
by the plaintiff, the supervisor's use of such terms would clearly seem to be
relevant to the issue of whether the other harassment of the plaintiff was
motivated by gender or just personal animosity.
It is even possible that this type of reasoning may affect the manner in
which courts evaluate the motivations behind racially harassing conduct. For
the most part, courts have had little difficulty recognizing that the use of racially
derogatory terms and other forms of racial harassment are racially
motivated.213 However, in Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co.,214 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted the racial nature of some of the
harassment complained of by the plaintiff, but held that the harassment of the
plaintiff was not racially motivated. The conduct complained of by the plaintiff
included a number of incidents of "pranks" or "hazing"; being called "nigger,"
"coon," and "black boy"; and-on the same day as he quit his job-an incident
in which a co-worker, after hearing a newscast about a shooting incident by a
black man, said, in the plaintiffs presence, that "that's just like a nigger; give
him a gun and he shoots anything that moves," a comment met with laughter
by the crew. There was also an incident in the workplace between the plaintiff
and an employee of a different company in which racial remarks were made.
Finally, on the oil rig platform, under the control of that other company, was a
tool shed labeled "KKK Headquarters. 215
In upholding the district court's conclusion that the harassment resulted not
from "an environment 'polluted with discrimination"' but from "an atmosphere
replete with instances of humiliating acts shared by all," the court of appeals
noted:
The district court found the latter, concluding that the hazing and practical
joking should be viewed realistically as male interaction and notatypical of the
work environment involved. The court determined that Vaughn used racial
slurs along with his co-employees and that other Pool employees were
212 See id. at 1381.
213 See, e.g., Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.
1993) ("ITlhe term 'nigger' is a universally recognized opprobrium, stigmatizing African-
Americans because of their race."); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 114
(7th Cir. 1990) (use of word "nigger" "even in jest could be evidence of racial antipathy");
Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981) (in connection with constructive
discharge claim, the black female plaintiff alleged that a hangman's noose had been hung in
the supply room; the district court noted, and the court of appeals agreed, that "[tihe message
conveyed or attempted to be conveyed by that action was unmistakable").
214 683 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982).
215 See id. at 923-24.
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subjected to the same obnoxious treatment. The court found it significant that
Vaughn's co-workers expressed amicable feelings towards Vaughn, which
negated a characterization of the atmosphere as "dangerously charged with
racial discrimination." Recognizing that derogatory remarks would constitute a
Title VII violation "upon attaining an excessive or opprobrious level,' the
court was persuaded that the evidence presented did not suggest"a malicious
or inordinate racial slur usage that would result in defendant's liability.' These
factual findings are not clearly erroneous. 2 16
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied in part on the
plaintiff's testimony that he did not believe that he was subjected to certain
pranks because he was black. However, the testimony quoted by the court in
the opinion does not support any suggestion that the plaintiff believed that the
racial slurs, which the court said usually accompanied the "pranks," were also
not directed at him because of his race.2 17 Accordingly, the court's reliance on
the plaintiff's "perception of his environment" in finding that the environment
was generally abusive but not "polluted with discrimination" is suspect.
Similarly, the court's reliance on the fact that white employees were also
subjected to "pranks" and "crude language" to find that the environment was
not racially abusive is also subject to challenge. First, there is no indication in
the decision that the language directed at the white employees was racial in
nature other than the unexplained statement that the plaintiff also used racial
slurs; because the decision does not indicate the nature of those slurs, it is not
clear that the slurs used were even directed at or derogatory to those white
employees. 218 Secondly, there is no indication that the plaintiffs presumably
216 Id. at 924-25. Although the court of appeals did note the district court's finding that
the plaintiff himself used racial slurs, there is no indication of the nature of the slurs used by
the plaintiff nor any indication that the plaintiff could be said to have "welcomed" the racially
harassing conduct to which he was subjected. For a discussion of the "welcomeness" aspects
of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
217 See id. at 925.
218 There seem to be at least two possibilities concerning the nature of the racial slurs
reportedly made by the black plaintiff. One possibility is that the black plaintiff used a racial
slur or slurs to refer to his white co-workers, such as the term "honkey." While use of such a
term would be clearly inappropriate and might even constitute actionable racial harassment in
certain circumstances, the use of racially offensive and racially motivated language directed at
white employees would not serve to excuse the racially offensive and racially motivated
language and conduct directed at the black plaintiff; both types of conduct would be racially
discriminatory and therefore prohibited by Title VII. The second possibility is that the black
plaintiff used a racial slur to refer to himself or members of the racial group to which he
belonged, such as referring to himself as a "nigger." Again, this use of a racial slur would
clearly be inappropriate in the context of the workplace but should not serve to excuse-or
render nondiscriminatory-use of the same or similar terms by white employees. Use of a
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all-white co-workers219 were subjected to anything resembling the racially
offensive stereotypes about members of their race reflected in the statement
"that's just like a nigger; give him a gun and he shoots anything that moves."
Finally, the presence of the term "KKK Headquarters" on a tool shed on the oil
rig would clearly seem to affect black employees differently from white
employees, creating a racially hostile, rather than just generally offensive,
environment.220
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas in Bernard v.
Doskocil Cos.221 recognized just such a distinction and rejected a similar
attempt by an employer to pass off racially hostile conduct as
nondiscriminatory. The employer had sought to characterize the harassment
complained of by the plaintiff, the sole black employee in the workplace, 222 as
"horseplay" and had asked the district court to "consider separately those
allegations involving 'behavior commonplace in the "blue collar environment"
from that conduct motivated by a racial animus' in evaluating plaintiffs
evidence supporting his racial harassment claim." Among the conduct
characterized as "horseplay" was being called a "black boy" by his assistant
foreman; being told by that foreman that "we don't allow your kind at the
water fountain"; using the term "nigger rigged"; the telling of racial jokes by
co-workers; the altering by co-workers of the settings on his welding tools and
the banging of hanmers on his work table; threatening to tie a lacquer-saturated
rag around his neck while he was welding; and placing a tungsten welding tip
derogatory term to refer to oneself, particularly if done in a joking or ironic manner, is not the
same as being bombarded with that term by members of a racial group known to have used
that term, and other terms, in a racially offensive and degrading manner.
219 Although the decision does not indicate whether the plaintiff was the only non-white
employee working on the oil rig, the lack of a reference to any other black employees
suggests that the remaining employees were in fact white. In addition, the fact that the
supervisor's reaction to the racially derogatory remark relating to the shooting incident was
that "they should have some respect for [Vaughn]" suggests that the plaintiff was the only
black employee. Vaughn, 683 F.2d at 924.
220 See also Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 549, 551, 554 (10th Cir. 1994)
(affiriing summary judgment for employer on black plaintiffs claim of a racially hostile
working environment, in part on the ground that he had not shown that the hostility directed at
the plaintiff by his co-workers was racially motivated, in spite of the fact that at least some of
the harassing conduct was explicitly racial in nature; two co-workers made racial remarks,
including use of the term "nigger" and telling the plaintiff "you better be careful because we
know people in [the] Ku Klux Klan").
221 861 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Kan. 1994).
222 See Bernard v. Doskocil Cos., 861 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (D. Kan. 1994) (decision of
district court considering the employer's motion for summary judgment on another of the
plaintiff's claims).
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in his chair resulting in an injury, which was later relied on by the employer to
justify the plaintiff's termination. 223 Rejecting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the district court indicated that there was evidence of a
racial motivation behind the "horseplay" to which the plaintiff was subjected:
[TMhe plaintiff in this case appears to have been subjected to a quantitatively
and qualitatively greater level of harassment than his co-workers. While
horseplay, pranks, and foul language may be commonplace at Reno.... the
horseplay, pranks, and language directed at plaintiff appear to have been
uniquely mean-spirited and numerous. The reason for this is, of course, not
entirely clear. But the fact that plaintiff was the only black employee certainly
suggests to this court that the motivating reason was plaintiffs race.224
Accordingly, the district court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the
opportunity to prove at trial that even the harassment directed at him that was
not explicitly racial in nature was in fact racially motivated. 225
The renewed focus of courts on the requirement that employees
demonstrate the discriminatory nature of sexually oriented conduct, and the
apparent willingness of those courts to accept other motivations for that
conduct, may well have an effect on the approach courts take to similar claims
that racially explicit conduct is not motivated by race. But such an approach is
inappropriate regardless of whether racial or sexual harassment is involved. Just
as it is troubling for courts to accept arguments that racially explicit conduct is
not racially discriminatory but instead "horseplay" or male-bonding, so it is
equally troublesome that courts would accept the use of sexually derogatory
terms such as "dick sucker," 'Tucking bitch," or "cunt" not to be
discriminatory on the basis of gender but merely to reflect personal animus. In
both situations, those epithets and slurs not only seek to communicate a
discriminatory message about the person and group at which they are leveled,
but they in fact have the effect of communicating that message. 226
223 See Bernard v. Doskocil Cos., 861 F. Supp. 1017, 1020-22 (D. Kan. 1994).
224 Id. at 1021.
225 See id. at 1022.
226 See Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996)
(noting that use of words such as "cunt" and "whore" to refer to the plaintiff are "sexual
epithets" that are "'intensely degrading' to women," and rejecting district court finding that
harassment of female plaintiff was not based on gender); Hurley v. The Atlantic City Police
Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396, 402 n.2 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting the harmful nature of graffiti that
referred to the female plaintiff as a "cunt").
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IV. CONCLUSION: ARE THE BENEFITS WORTH THE RISKS?
Judging the wisdom and appropriateness of using analogies between racial
harassment and sexual harassment requires not only an inquiry that addresses
the extent to which such analogies are factually accurate, but also one that
considers the manner in which those analogies have been used in practice and
weighs the relative costs and benefits of use of those analogies.
The discussion contained in Part I reveals that there are indeed certain
dangers and risks that accompany the use of analogies between race and sex in
the area of workplace harassment. A study of the courts' treatment of racial
harassment claims and sexual harassment claims indicates that some courts have
used explicit and implicit analogies between race and sex to make it more
difficult to establish the existence of racial harassment, by importing the
standards for sexual harassment claims into the standards of proof for racial
harassment claims. Accordingly, some courts have begun to use language
suggesting that "welcomeness" may be an issue in racial harassment claims, so
that it becomes relevant to ask whether the target of harassment somehow
invited that behavior.227 The movement of courts toward a more "gender-
neutral" (or gender-blind, which may not be the same thing)228 perspective for
judging sexually harassing conduct may also cause courts to reject the relevance
of the experience of racial minorities with racially threatening and offensive
conduct. 229 The use of the standard developed in the context of sexual
harassment requiring that conduct be "severe or pervasive" in order to be
actionable has led the courts to conclude that even quite damaging and serious
racially motivated behavior, including references to lynching or racially
motivated assault, is insufficient to state a cause of action for racial
harassment.230 The use of standards of employer liability developed in
connection with sexual harassment claims in the context of racial harassment
claims may well leave many employees victimized by racially hostile
workplaces with no remedy for this discriminatory and damaging behavior.231
Analogies between race and sex may also lead courts to conclude that even
2 2 7 See supra text accompanying notes 126-32.
228 While the term "gender-neutral" suggests inclusion, so that the perspectives of both
genders are taken into account, use of that standard has been asserted to perpetuate male
biases about the appropriateness of sexual conduct in the workplace. See, e.g., Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626-27 (6th Cir. 1987) (Keith, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The term "gender-blind" more accurately describes a standard that
suggests that the gender is irrelevant to the issue being considered.22 9 See supra text accompanying note 161.
2 30 See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 192-94.
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racially explicit conduct is not racially motivated, similar to the conclusions
drawn by some courts that sexually explicit conduct is not motivated by
gender.2 32
There are also other dangers of analogizing race and sex. One such danger
is that analogizing race and sex threatens to obscure the importance that race
plays in our society and the fact that there are real and important differences
between race and sex. Professors Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman have
pointed to the negative effects that the use of analogies between race and sex
have had in the context of gatherings of legal academics:
When a speaker compared sexism and racism, the significance of race was
marginalized and obscured, and the different role that race plays in the lives of
people of color and of whites was overlooked. The concerns ofwhites became
the focus of discussion, even when the conversation had been supposedly
centered on race discrimination. Essentialist presumptions became implicit in
the discussion; it would be assumed, for example, that all women are white
and all African-Americans are men. Finally, people with little experience in
thinking about racism/white supremacy, but who had a hard-won
understanding of the allegedly analogous oppression (sexism or some other -
ism), assumed that they comprehended the experience of people of color and
thus had standing to speak on their behalf.233
Professor Angela Davis raises a somewhat similar concern about analogies
drawn between race and sex by early feminists arguing for women's rights.234
She notes that white women arguing for women's suffrage and other rights
often invoked the name of slavery to describe the institution of marriage. She
notes:
The early feminists may well have described marriage as "slavery" of the
same sort Black people suffered primarily for the shock value of the
comparison-fearing that the seriousness of their protest might otherwise be
missed. They seem to have ignored, however, the fact that their identification
of the two institutions also implied that slavery was really no worse than
marriage.235
2 3 2 See supra text accompanying notes 214-26.
2 33 Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implications of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991
DuKE L.J. 397, 399.
234 See DAVIS, supra note 69.
2 35 Id. at 33-34. Professor Davis notes, however, that there were also positive aspects of
the comparison between race and sex as used by white women in the 1830s: the very use of
the comparison indicates that even "white middle-class women felt a certain affinity with
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Accordingly, one of the dangers that needs to be guarded against when
analogizing race and sex is the suggestion that racism and sexism, or racial
harassment and sexual harassment, are identical, rather than merely comparable
in certain aspects. If drawing analogies between race and sex is seen as an
attempt to belittle, or even has the unintended result of belittling, the importance
of race and the evil of racism, then the use of analogies between race and sex
could pose more dangers than are justified by the potential benefits of such
comparisons.
But there are also some benefits that arise as a result of analogizing race
and sex. Use of these analogies may help to clarify the discriminatory nature of
both types of harassment and may help decisionmakers to see the harmful
effects of both types of activities. In addition, the discomfort that occurs from
application of standards created with sexual harassment in mind to claims of
racial harassment may even serve to inform decisionmakers about the
inappropriateness of those standards for the sexual harassment claims for which
they are designed. For example, if decisionmakers find themselves objecting to
even the question of whether racially degrading and demeaning conduct is
"welcome" to its targets, perhaps those same decisionmakers might start to take
issue with similar questions in the context of sexually degrading and demeaning
conduct. Recognition of the absurdity of the assertion that racially offensive
comments and actions are not racially motivated may well lead decisionmakers
to question similar claims that use of sexual epithets toward women are not
motivated by gender. Understanding that the experiences of racial minorities
affect the way that they experience and perceive racially related behavior might
trigger awareness that women's perceptions are also shaped by their experience
of sexual conduct misplaced into the workplace. And the appreciation that even
one incident of racially threatening conduct-such as hanging a noose over the
workstation of a black employee or burning a cross in his or her presence-can
itself create a racially hostile work environment may help decisionmakers to
realize that a single incident of sexually offensive and degrading behavior, such
as the touching of a woman on her breast or genitals against her will even a
single time, can irreversibly alter her work environment.
These effects analogizing race and sex may act to the benefit of both
employees bringing sexual harassment and those bringing racial harassment
claims. To the extent that the Supreme Court's decision in Harris suggests that
all claims of workplace harassment should be subject to the same legal
standards, the realization that currently recognized requirements are
inappropriate for sexual harassment claims may cause the EEOC and the courts
to abandon those standards for all harassment claims, making it less difficult for
all employees to establish the illegality of harmful and discriminatory workplace
Black men and women, for whom slavery meant whips and chains." Id. at 34.
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harassment.
Recognition of the similarities and overlap between racial harassment and
sexual harassment may also serve other purposes. A number of commentators
have argued that the interests of black women are harmed and marginalized
when racism and sexism are treated as two completely different types of
discrimination, rather than recognizing the intersection of race and sex.236 As
Professor Angela Harris asserts:
In this society, it is only white people who have the luxury of "having no
color"; only white people have been able to imagine that sexism and racism are
separate experiences. Far more for black women than for white women the
experience of self is precisely that of being unable to disentangle the web of
race and gender-of being enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory,
discourses of sexuality and color.237
Analogizing race and sex also may act to foster alliances that are useful in
furthering the interests of both women and minorities. White women who have
never been the target of racial animus or harassment may be better able to
understand the harm caused by racially harassing behavior because of the
similarities of that harm to the harm which they suffer by the humiliation and
belittling effects of sexual harassment.238 Minority-group men may better
understand the harm caused by sexual harassment-even their own participation
in sexual harassment-if they are confronted with the comparison of that
behavior to their own experiences of racial harassment and discrimination.
Even majority-group men, who are less likely to have personally experienced
either form of discrimination but who may be able to recognize the injuries
caused by one or the other type of behavior, might be made to focus on the
harmful nature of the analogous conduct.
236 See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing Race and Sex, supra note 107, at 139-40, 166-67.
Professors Grillo and Wildman also argue that the assumption that race and sex are distinct
categories ignores and renders invisible the experiences of black women, although they argue,
as I do not understand Professor Crenshaw to do, that use of analogies between race and sex
requires this assumption. Grillo & Wildman, supra note 233, at 404-05.
237 Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
581, 604 (1990).
2 38 See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, Working Paper No.
189, Wellesley College Center for Research for Women (1988), reprinted in BENDER &
BRAvEMAN, supra note 204, at 22 (author, a white female, discusses how her understandings
of male privilege and the reluctance of men to recognize the results of male privilege helped
her to understand her similar reluctance to see and recognize how she benefited from white
privilege).
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Analogizing race and sex in the area of harassment law is indeed a "two-
edged sword." Although the potential risks bf use of this analogy are
considerable, so are the benefits. Whether the benefits are worth the risks
depends on whether decisionmakers can be made to understand that racially
related and sexually related conduct, at least when it occurs in the context of the
workplace, creates a harm that may not be immediately apparent to them
because of their lack of experience as the target of such harmful behavior.
Paradoxically, use of analogy can be a critical tool in furthering that
understanding, because use of analogy can help decisionmakers to understand
that conduct targeted at others is similar to conduct of which that decisionmaker
himself or herself may have been the target. But without that understanding and
willingness to take both sexually harassing and racially harassing conduct
seriously, the use of analogies between race and sex can actually result in the
trivializing of both types of activity.
